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Chapter I
-
Introduction
On February 19. 1999. the State election in the German State of Hessen triggered
a heavy reaction among those who were following the elections over television. More
precisely, their response was divided along their political preference. Those in support of
the governing party were shocked and those in favor of the opposition were enthusiastic.
The reason for this reaction was that the former opposition had just won the State
elections with a stunning and unexpected landslide victory.
Although analysts may dispute the details, one element clearly stands out. Many
voters from the entire spectrum of different parties voted for the opposition because of
her preceding public campaign. A key part of this campaign was a successful petition
against a new citizenship law. which was proposed by the new German federal
government only a couple of weeks before the election. 1
The new law's purpose was to give legal aliens living in Germany a choice to
become German citizens without having to give up the nationality which was conferred
on them by their parentage or descent. The campaign led by the opposition sought to
motivate people against the general granting of double nationality and was quite
successful as the landslide victory showed.
Giinter Renner. Grundgesetz und deutsche Staatsangehorigkeit [Constitution and German Citizenship}.
Nele Justiz 230. 234 ( 1 999).
1
In the following months, the proposed citizenship law was significantly modified. A
protracted legislative and highly political process led to a compromise between some of
the opposing views and resulted in the creation of a combined ius soli and ius sanguinis
principle. After the approval of the German Federal Council the new citizenship law was
finally enacted by federal legislation in July 1999." This newly enacted law will have a
significant impact especially on German private international law that is already in
discussion.
3
It ended the domination of the ius sanguinis principle in German citizenship
law and introduced elements of the ius soli principle, which were so far unknown to the
German citizenship system. Although the law as finally enacted allows double
nationality on a far more limited basis than the original draft, the effects of an expected
increasing number of people with double nationality will most certainly demand an
adjustment to certain German private international law sections. The major issue arises
out of the fact that German private international law uses nationality as the predominant
connecting factor in determining a person's legal status (e.g. marriage and marriage
property law. right of succession and the right to the use of a name).'
Apart from this main issue, however, there is also the matter of constitutionality.
The opposition has already made it clear that it will attack the new law in the Federal
Constitution Court on the grounds of being unconstitutional. If the new law is considered
Gesetz zur Reform des Staatsangehorigkeitsrechts [Federal Law concerning the reform of Citizenship
Law] v. 15.7.1999 (BGB1. I S. 1618-20).
See Urs Peter Gruber, Kollisionsrechtliche Implikationen des neuen Staatsangehorigkeitsrechts [The
Implications of the new German Citizenship Law on Private International Law], PRAXIS DES
INTERNATIONALEN Privat- Und VEREAHRENSRECHTS 426-429 (1999) [hereinafter IPRax].
See Jiirgen Riittgers, Sie haben ein Flickwerk vorgelegt [You have submitted a patchwork], 21-22 DAS
PARLAMENT 16 (1999); see also The Motion of the F.D.P. Parliamentary Group in
BlTNDESTAGSDRUCKSACHE 14 / 867 P. 17 (1999).
5 ElNFUHRUNGSGESETZ Zum BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH [German Private International Law] art. 10, 13-
15, 25 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter EGBGB],
to be unconstitutional, it is not likely to withstand the attack and the effects on German
private international law will fade. For this reason, a part of this thesis will deal with
constitutionality issues, which also involve a short glimpse at the principle ofpacta sunt
servanda in the field of international law.
The general expectation across the entire political spectrum is that the number of
people with double nationality will in increase. Therefore, since nationality alone cannot
connect a person with the substantive rules of a particular system if that person has two
nationalities,
6
the problems with this particular connecting factor are also likely to
increase. One or more additional factors must then be used to reach a result. In
Germany, this is achieved by introducing the concept of "effective" nationality in
article 5 (1) of the Private International Law Code (EGBGB).
One detail, which is set forth in this provision and will be given special
consideration in this thesis, is the concept of rigidly preferring the German nationality to
any other by declaring it to be the effective nationality in all cases. The expected
increase of double nationality cases has already raised the issue of whether this particular
code section should be modified.
Furthermore, this thesis will question whether this rigid concept should be
completely abolished after an assessment of both the constitutionality and the exact
implications of the new citizenship law. In the light of the conclusions, the comparative
part of this thesis will then focus on a more general approach and will compare the
6
Cf. 1 Lawrence Collins et al., Dicey And Morris On The Conflict Of Laws 169 (1 1th ed., Trevor
C. Hartley et al. eds., 1987) (hereinafter Dicey & Morris); P.M. North & J. J. Fawcett, Cheshire And
North's Private International Law 167 (12th ed. 1992).
7
See art. 5(1) EGBGB.
See id.
concepts of nationality and domicile with special emphasis on their practical application
in both common and civil law jurisdictions.
First, there will be a presentation of the different common law jurisdictions and
the way each defines and applies the concept of domicile. Next, I will compare the
merits and drawbacks of both the nationality and the domicile concept. Finally, I will
analyze whether one of the concepts of domicile found in the various common law
jurisdictions is likely and fit for a solution of the citizenship law problem.
In the final chapter, this thesis will present the concept of habitual residence
(which could become a connecting factor in the future of private international law) and
will broaden the inquiry to whether there is a chance for convergence of the common and
civil law jurisdictions on that particular connecting factor at some point in the future.
Chapter II -
The Newly Enacted German Citizenship Law
In order to assess the private international law implications of the newly-enacted
citizenship law, a consideration of its major changes concerning the number of people
with double nationality as well as its likelihood to survive an almost certain
constitutionality test is indispensable. One of the major changes of the new law, which
has entered into force on the 1 st of January 2000, is a change or at least a modification
of the principle underlying the law.
Generally, there are two major concepts by which a country confers its nationality
on citizens, the ius soli and the ius sanguinis principle. The ius soli principle confers
nationality on the basis of where an individual is born, whereas the ius sanguinis
principle looks at parentage or descent of a person
10
and grants nationality on the basis of
bloodlines. One of the two is predominant in every single country, however according to
international law each country can also implement a mixture between the two principles
since international law gives every nation complete discretion about who it considers to
be of its nationality."
Gesetz zur Reform des Staatsangehorigkeitsrechts [Federal Law concerning the reform of Citizenship
Law], v. 15.7.1999 (BGB1. 1 S. 1624) [hereinafter Citizenship Law].
THEODOR Maunz et al., 2 Grundgesetz - Kommentar [A Commentary on The Constitution],
§ Art. 16 Abs. I 15 (Albrecht Randelzhofer et al. eds., 35th update, Munchen 1999).
See Giinter Renner, supra note 1 at 234; Jiirgen Smaluhn. Verfassungrechtliche Aspekte einer Reform des
Staatsangehorigkeitsrechts [Constitutional aspects of a reform in citizenship law], DAS STANDESAMT 98,
100.(1998).
In fact, it has even been said that a "pure" form of either the ius soli or the ius
sanguinis principle can only rarely be found.
12
Until the 1st of January 2000, German
citizenship law followed the ius sanguinis principle, which meant that a person could
only get the German nationality if he or she descended from a German parent.
J Due to
the enactment of the new citizenship law, the ius sanguinis principle will be
supplemented with elements of the ius soli principle. Additionally, there are also some
changes with respect to the naturalization of foreign children.
A. Obtaining German nationality' as a result of the introduction of the IMS soli
principle and by naturalization
With the new German Citizenship Law the Federal legislature has introduced the
ius soli principle without abandoning the ius sanguinis principle. Since the principle of
ius sanguinis works on the basis of bloodlines, under the former law double nationality
could only occur if a child born in Germany had parents with different nationalities. This
will change considerably with the "additional introduction" 1 of the ius soli principle now
in force, since the new law combines nationality based upon the place of birth together
with parentage and also enables naturalized persons to maintain their old nationality
under certain circumstances.
12 Klaus Stern, 1 Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Public Law of The
Federal Republic Of Germany] 254 (2d ed. 1984).
13 Thomas Erdinger, Einburgerung als Option [Naturalization as an option], DEUTSCHE RlCHTERZEITUNG
165(1999).
Id. at 233; But see Rupert Scholz, Verfassungsgrenzen fur doppelte Staatsangehorigkeit [Constitutional
Limits for double nationality, DEUTSCHE RlCHTERZEITUNG 175 (1999) who speaks of an "unrestrained"
introduction of the ius soli principle, thus contradicting his earlier article Staatsangehorigkeit und
Grundgesetz [Citizenship and Constitution], NEUE .lURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRJFT [NJW] 1510, 1515
(1999) where he speaks only of a "supplementary" introduction of the principle.
See Rupert Scholz & Arnd Uhle, Staatsangehorigkeit und Grundgesetz [Citizenship and Constitution],
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1510, 1515(1999).
1.
German nationality by virtue of birth (§ 4 (3) Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz (StAG))
As already mentioned, the most profound change in principle is the introduction
of the ius soli principle. According to § 4 (3) of the new citizenship law (officially
abbreviated and hereinafter referred to as "StAG" 16 ), a person of foreign descent can
receive German nationality when born in Germany if one of the parents has lawfully had
his or her habitual residence in Germany for a period of eight years and if that parent has
either a permanent right to reside or has possessed an unlimited residence permit for a
period of at least three years.
17
Since this code section only applies to newborn children whose parents are
foreign nationals, the impact of the new law is that newborn foreign children will
1 o
regularly obtain a double nationality on a regular basis. If the parents both possess
different foreign nationalities, the impact of the new law can even be that the child has
three nationalities: the nationality of the mother if her home country also follows the ius
sanguinis principle, the nationality of the father if that is true for his home country as
well, and German nationality by virtue of § 4 (3) StAG.
19
It is safe to say at this point
that the new code section will result in an increasing number of citizens with two or even
three nationalities.
2. German nationality by virtue of naturalization (§ 40 b StAG)
Another ground for receiving German nationality is the newly inserted
naturalization provision of § 40 b StAG.
See Art. 1 (1) of the Citizenship Law, supra note 9, at 1618.
17
Id.
See Gruber, supra note 3 at 427.
19
See id. at 427 n. 7.
8According to this section, a foreign national who lawfully had his or her habitual
residence in Germany on January 1, 2000 and is not older than 10 years has a legal right
to be naturalized if the conditions of § 4 (3) StAG are present for him as well as his
parents, and if the application for naturalization is filed until the 3 1 st of December
2000.
20 The result of naturalization is that the person will also acquire double nationality.
This can be inferred from the fact that the new § 29 (1) StAG requires the person to drop
one of the existing nationalities if the German nationality is conferred upon the person by
virtue of § 40 b StAG.
21
With respect to the amount of affected people, one has to note that this code
section does not merely require the person to meet and continue and abide by the
preconditions of § 4 (3) StAG, but also limits its scope to children of foreign nationality
who meet an additional multitude of requirements. They must be under ten years of age
on a certain day, manage to learn about the new law. decide in favor of naturalization and
apply for it to the appropriate government agency. Furthermore, all this must be done
within one year.
In simpler words, this code provision requires no less than seven preconditions
which have to be met cumulatively and which all limit the scope of the statute to a very
detailed group of children who can meet all these requirements. Every requirement that
has to be met decreases the number of affected children and it is possible that after seven
requirements there will be no one left to be naturalized. The extreme time limit of one
year and the residence permit requirements are capable of reducing the scope of the
20
See Art. 1 (8) Citizenship Law, supra note 9, at 1619.
21
See the new § 29 (1) StAG printed in Id. at 1619.
" See id.
statute considerably. In the absence of exact empirical data and assuming that somebody
indeed does meet all these criteria at once, it is yet safe to say that the number of
inhabitants who will be entitled to naturalization by this provision will not be comparable
at all to the number of people that § 4 (3) StAG will affect.
B. Details about the increase in number of citizens with double nationality
After the introduction of these provisions, it is important to know that the double
nationality conferred by virtue of § 4 (3) StAG is limited in time. Furthermore, the right
to be naturalized according to § 40 b StAG only results in permanent double nationality
under certain circumstances.
1 . Termination of one nationality at 23 years of age according to § 29 StAG
Section 29 (1) of the newly enacted law requires any person within the scope of
§ 4 (3) StAG to make a choice between the German nationality conferred upon him or her
by virtue of § 4 (3) or § 40 b StAG and the foreign nationality which is conferred upon
them by another country's' ius sanguinis principle. This choice must be made in
writing" when the person reaches the age of majority, which is age of 18 in Germany.24
Due to the fact that the person eventually has to decide in favor of one nationality, the
newly enacted citizenship law has been referred to as the "option model."25
Given the importance of this choice, one issue naturally arose during the
legislative process. The question was what would happen if the person either negligently
forgets about the duty to choose or ignores it in order to retain the foreign nationality.
23
See id. at 1618.
24
§ 2 BGB. (F.R.G).
25
See Scholz & Uhle, supra note 15, at 1515; Gruber, supra note 3, at 427; Erdinger, supra note 13, at 165.
10
First, the legislature made sure to give the person enough time to make up his or
her mind, therefore the decision period was set to begin at the eighteenth birthday and to
end five years later.
26
In addition, the legislature made sure that, at least as a general rule,
only one nationality would remain after the twenty-third birthday by implementing
§ 29 (2) and (3) StAG. If the person decides to keep the foreign nationality, the German
nationality ceases to exist upon receipt of the choice in writing by the government
agency.
27
If the person chooses to keep the German nationality, it is the goal of the new
law that the other nationality conferred by parentage ceases to exist. Therefore, once the
choice is made, the person is obliged to submit proof of the abandonment or the loss of
the foreign nationality. If that duty is not fulfilled until the 23rd birthday, the general rule
TO
is that the German citizenship is cancelled.
However, an exception is granted if the person has applied for permission to keep
the German nationality. In this case, the German nationality only ceases to exist once the
permission is denied by the government agency and the declining decision has become
unappealable. Therefore, the new citizenship law carves out two phases between which
the nationality shifts. In the first phase, the person who falls within the scope of
§ 4 (3) StAG has two nationalities: the German nationality conferred by the new
citizenship law and the foreign nationality conferred by parentage. This phase lasts from
birth until the ultimate decision to keep the German nationality "offered" by
§ 4 (3) StAG. Once the decision is made, the second phase begins in which only one
26
Cf. the new § 29 (3) StAG reprinted in Art. 1 (8) Citizenship Law supra note 9, at 1619.
27
See § 29 (2) StAG reprinted in id.
28
See § 29 (3) StAG reprinted in id
For details see discussion infra Part II. B. 2.
nationality remains.
30 As a preliminary conclusion it must therefore be noted that double
nationality is generally established for people falling within the scope of § 4 (3) StAG but
is also generally eliminated not later than the person's twenty-third birthday.
2. Permission to keep the German nationality according to § 29 (3) StAG in connection
with § 87 AuslG
As already mentioned, the new law leaves the person with double nationality one
loophole to escape the consequence of losing one of his or her nationalities. According to
the new § 29 (3) StAG, the person can file a written application for permission to retain
his or her German nationality. 31 The application has to be submitted before the twenty-
first birthday. According to § 29 (4) StAG, the permission has to be given if the loss or
abandonment of the foreign nationality is either impossible or unreasonable.
Furthermore, the new code section mandates that the government authorities give
permission if double nationality could be or would have to be accepted according to the
new § 87 of the Federal Code for the Treatment of Foreign Nationals, the
"Auslandergesetz". 33 In connection with § 29 (4) StAG, this provision exempts a foreign
national who is naturalized from the usual requirement of giving up his or her nationality
if that nationality cannot be abandoned or if the abandonment would result in an
unacceptable hardship. Together with the change of the citizenship law, the legislature
presented a long list of examples that constitute such a hardship.
30
Gruber, supra note 3, at 427.
31
See Art. 1 (8) of the Citizenship Law, supra note 9, at 1618.
32
Id.
33
See the new § 87 AuslG reprinted in Art. 2 (1) of the Citizenship Law, supra note 9, at 1620.
34
Id.
12
a) The exception list of § 87 ( 1 ) AuslG
The most important group of cases of exception will probably originate from the
general exception of the new § 87 (1) Nr. 4 and 5 AuslG. According to these subsections,
permission to retain foreign nationality has to be given if its abandonment causes
disproportionate difficulties and the denial of the permission would result in an intense
financial or economical hardship for the person.
3
The first significant provision (§ 87 (l)Nr.4 AuslG) states that permission must
be given if the denaturalization is accompanied by "disproportionate difficulties" and the
denial of the naturalization would result in an "unbearable hardship." 6 It has been
speculated that this exception will enable many elderly people to keep their foreign
nationality. Although it remains nebulous why the abandonment of foreign nationality
should constitute a hardship especially for older people in so many cases, this provision is
one possibility that is likely to result in an increasing number of people with double
nationality.
The next interesting loophole, which might enable the retention of double
nationality, is § 87 (1) Nr.5 AuslG. It has been said that this particular new provision will
offer "hundreds of thousands of foreigners the possibility of double nationality"38 and
will lead to the establishment of general double nationality through the back door. 39 This,
however, is a fundamental error at least with respect to the biggest40 and by far most
important group of foreigners in Germany who will fall within the scope of § 87 AuslG,
35
Id.
36
See the new § 87 (1) Nr. 4 AuslG reprinted in Art. 2 (1) of the Citizenship Law, supra note 9, at 1621.
37
Scholz, supra note 14, at 176.
38
Id.
39
See Scholz & Uhle, supra note 15, at 1516.
See Smaluhn, supra note 1 1, at 107.
namely the Turkish citizens. According to former Turkish citizenship law, a Turkish
national who gave up his nationality in order to be naturalized somewhere else lost
fundamental rights, most importantly the right to inherit and to own property.
41
It is also
correct that such an imminent loss of rights would most likely be considered to constitute
a hardship within the meaning of the new § 87 (1) Nr.5 AuslG.
4-
This would necessarily
result in a grant of permission to keep double nationality in accordance with to § 29 (3)
StAG.
However, according to a fairly recent amendment, Turkish citizens who decide to
abandon their nationality in order to be naturalized somewhere else can maintain their
rights, in particular with respect to the right of inheritance and the right to purchase,
transfer or keep real estate and personal property. This exception to the general rule has
been introduced into Turkish citizenship law in 1995 4j and will most certainly eliminate
the possibility of acknowledging a hardship per §87(1) Nr.5 AuslG, at least on the
grounds of an imminent loss of substantial rights. This will significantly reduce the
number of persons that can be expected to obtain the permission to retain their foreign
nationality by virtue of § 29 (3) in connection with § 87 (1 ) Nr. 5 StAG.
Having reached this result, the impact concerning the number of people who will
receive double nationality by virtue of § 29 (3) in connection with § 87 (1) Nr. 5 AuslG
remains uncertain. The terms "disproportionate difficulties" and "unbearable hardship"
41
id.
According to Makarov and von Mangoldt, the loss of private property as a result of a loss of nationality
constituted a hardship according to the old § 87 (1) Nr.4 AuslG. See ALEXANDER N. MAKAROV & HANS
von Mangoldt, Deutsches Staatsange- horjgkeitsrecht [German Citizenship law] § 87 AuslG
23 (3rd ed., 12th update 1998).
43
41 12 sayili ve 07.06.1995 tarihli Turk Vatandaslik Kanunu [Amendment the Turkish Citizenship Law
dated 7th of June 1995] Art. 2 (Tr.).
14
AA
for obtaining the permission seem to be fairly indefinite; therefore, the daily experience
in the government agencies will have to show how these terms will be interpreted. Thus,
although there is the possibility of an increase in the number of people with double
nationality due to a retention to be granted it is too early to precisely assess the concrete
extent of the increase. However, given the fact that under the old citizenship law, over
300,000 persons were naturalized in 1996 and no less than 42,000 Turkish citizens in
1997,
45
it is safe to assume that there will be a not insubstantial number of cases where
people successfully apply for the retention of their foreign nationality, even if one
considers the discussed restrictions to obtain the permission for retention. This will
certainly increase the number of persons living in Germany who have a double
nationality.
b) The general exception for European Union citizens
There will also be a general exception for people who are citizens of the European
Union. According to the new § 87 (2) AuslG, double nationality has to be accepted as a
result of naturalization if the person has the nationality of a member state of the European
Union and reciprocity exists. 46 Reciprocity means that the state whose nationality is to be
kept must also allow the retention of a foreign nationality (in this case the German one) in
its citizenship law.
For a correct assessment of how large the scope of this exception will be, a short
look into the citizenship law of the European Union members is necessary.
44
Cf. Scholz, supra note 14, at 176.
Kai Hailbronner, Doppelte Staatsangehorigkeit [Double nationality], ZEITSCHRJFT FUR AUSLANDERECHT
51 (1999).
46
See the new § 87 (2) AuslG printed in Art. 2 ( 1 ) of the Citizenship Law, supra note 9, at 1 62 1
.
15
In general, in almost all western European countries have enacted citizenship
legislation which grants descendants of foreigners an option for naturalization which
usually includes the possibility of retaining the foreign nationality and thus accepting the
consequence of double nationality.
47 With respect to European Union members.
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Portugal generally allow a foreigner to retain his or
her old nationality whereas Denmark, Finland, Austria, The Netherlands and Sweden
generally require the foreign national to give up his old nationality if he desires to be
naturalized. This means that there is an almost equal division between countries that
give reciprocity by allowing a German national to retain his old nationality upon
naturalization and those countries where reciprocity in the meaning of the new § 87 (2)
AuslG does not exist.
For Great Britain and Ireland, the case is more difficult since neither have
provisions in their citizenship laws that explicitly deal with the question of whether
abandoning the former nationality is required upon naturalization.49 However, with
respect to the United Kingdom, this silence seems to be in favor of accepting double
nationality even upon naturalization because this country has signed the convention on
Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality50 but has explicitly restricted its ratification
only to the section concerning the problem of military service problems. 51
Cf. Hailbronner, supra note 45, at 52.
Paul Glauben, Das Staatsangehorigkeitsrecht im europaischen Vergleich [The citizenship law in the
European countries in comparison] DEUTSCHE RlCHTERZEITUNG 1 52, 1 52- 1 58 ( 1 999)w
Id. at 154-55.
See Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of
Multiple Nationality, Europ. T.S. No. 43 (1963). The English original version can also be found at BGB! II
S. 1953(1969).
1
Glauben, supra note 48, at 155. The ratification announcement can be found in BGB1. II S. 1 120 (1971).
16
This leaves the task of actively reducing cases of multiple nationality to other
member contracting states. The same is true with respect to the Republic of Ireland.
Thus the United Kingdom and Ireland must be considered as countries where reciprocity
in the meaning of the new § 87 (2) AuslG is present since it has not ratified the part of the
above mentioned convention which was designed to actively reduce the cases of double
nationality. Therefore, reciprocity within the meaning of § 87 (2) AuslG also exists in
these two countries.
It must also be noted that the almost equal division among the European Union
countries does not equal an equal division with respect to the number of people who
might fall within the scope of the new § 87 (2) AuslG. In fact, significantly more foreign
nationals from the first group of countries (e.g. Italy, Portugal, and Greece) are living in
Germany than those who are from countries who do not give reciprocity. Since most of
the guest workers living in Germany (except for the Turkish ones) are nationals of either
Italy, Portugal or Greece, the new § 87 (2) AuslG is likely to facilitate a great number of
cases in which the retention of the foreign nationality will be allowed. This will also lead
to an increasing number of persons with double nationality.
3. Double nationality for people with a right to naturalization according to § 40 b StAG
For the persons who have a right to be naturalized according to § 40 b StAG, the
same basic principle applies with respect to § 87 AuslG. This means that double
nationality will be accepted upon naturalization if either one of the above-mentioned
exceptions of the new § 87 AuslG will be present. However, since the new § 40 b StAG
52
Id. The ratification announcement can be found in BGB1. II S. 714 (1973).
will probably not affect a great number of people, the increase of cases with double
nationality by virtue of the connection of § 40 b StAG and 87 AuslG will be almost
negligible.
4. Conclusion
Considering the new provisions in view of their potential to cause double
nationality the most significant and important change likely to produce a dramatic
increase of cases with double nationality is the limited introduction of the ius soli
principle. It will affect every person of foreign descent who is born in Germany and will
confer the status of double nationality upon him or her as a general rule in all cases at
least until the person has reached the age of 23. Even after that, the described
possibilities of retaining the old nationality are always available if the person has chosen
to apply in time. This will increase the number of cases with double nationality even
further. It seems that compared to former times an immense number of persons are likely
to have both German and foreign nationality in the future according to the new
citizenship law.
C. Constitutionality of the newly enacted law
Of course, the new citizenship law can only have an impact if it will stand the
constitutionality test to which it will most certainly be subjected. As mentioned above,
the issue is highly political and the debate spans through all parties and their supporters. 54
The oppositional Christian Democratic Party (CDU), which successfully drew up the
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
54
See Edinger, supra note 13, at 166.
above-mentioned widely suppor.ec petition has ahead} irjwunced thai it will
challenge the new citizenship law before the German Federal Constitution Court on the
grounds of being unconstitutional.
M The CDU can call on the support of over one third of
the members of the Federal Parliament and is therefore entitled to apply for judicial
review according to the constitution without having to wait until an actual case
c : dcerning the new law is litigated."
If the Federal Constitution Court holds the law to be unconstitutional, the
citizenship law will be struck down and deprived of its effect Ahead} shortly after the
commencement of the act. an intense discussion amongst the opposing views has started
and there is much more discussion > e: I : a me Although it is neither the time nor the
place to have all of the extensive discussion here, a look into the various constitutionality
iss aes of the new- law is essential.
1 . Unconstitutionality because of .Article 16 (1) of the German constitution
The first and most obvious constitutional concern about the new citizenship lara i s
connected with the fact that according I : §25 3 StAG, the German nationality will be
lost if either the pens a lee ies in favor of keeping the foreign nationality or remains
inactive and loses the German nationality automatically on his or her 23rd birthday.
Since the German nationality could cease .: exist under the new law. there might be a
conflict with article 16(1) of the German constitutior. GG According :: mat pro* iskm,
the "deprivation" of German nationality is absolutely illegitimate.
5
" Renner. supra note I . y. 2~- -
5e
Edinger. supra note 13. at 168.
GR. *7nvnoN]arL95 '"•- I FJ : [hereinafter GG].
GGarL I6(1)SJ -
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In contrast to that, the "loss" of German nationality is admissible, but only if
justified by federal law that has to meet certain requirements. Furthermore, a loss of
German nationality against the will of the person can only be constitutional if the person
does not become stateless due to this loss. 59 Therefore, the first delineation has to be
made between a possibly admissible loss and an inadmissible deprivation.
a) The possibility of § 29 (3) being an inadmissible deprivation
The constitution does not help to delineate deprivation and simple loss of
nationality.
60
According to one interpretation, a deprivation occurs if the nationality is
taken away by an act of the state without or against the will of the person.
61 The
opposing view is that a deprivation is unavoidable whereas a loss can be avoided. " The
second view seems to be favorable because of certain inconsistencies of the first opinion
and historical reasons. According to § 1 7 StAG, the German nationality ceases to exist if
a German national is naturalized in another country or adopted by a foreign national. In
both cases, the will of the person is irrelevant which would mean that according to the
definition of the first opinion, § 1 7 StAG would be a deprivation, in contradiction with
article 16 (1) S.l GG and therefore unconstitutional. 6 " In order to escape this logical but
undesired result, the first opinion subordinates a kind of "partial alienation" in the will of
the person. Of course, there may be a presumption that the willingness to be
naturalized somewhere else is an indication for a will to give up the German nationality.
59
Id. art. 16(1)S.2(F.R.G.).
60
Scholz & Uhle, supra note 1 5, at 1 5 1 1
.
61
See MAKAROV & VON MANGOLDT, supra note 42, § 2 (Art.16 GG) 21 (3rd ed., 1 1th update 1997)
62 Maunz, supra note 10, at 3 1 ; Scholz & Uhle, supra note 1 5, at 1 5 1 1
.
63
See Smaluhn, supra note 1 1 , at 98.
64
See MAUNZ, supra note 1 0, at 3 1
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However, it is still very possible that the actual intent of the person is to keep both
nationalities. In this situation, the first view would either have to admit that the will of
the person is not a good criterion for delineation or face the consequences and declare §
17 StAG to be unconstitutional. However, one cannot suppose that these traditional
grounds for losing German citizenship are unconstitutional because they were already in
existence when the constitution was drafted. 65 In addition to that, the usage of the
person's will to indicate a deprivation is in direct conflict with the second sentence of
article 16(1) GG according to which a loss of nationality can occur against the will of the
person as long as the result is not statelessness. It is illogical to assume that, on the one
hand, the inadmissible deprivation is characterized as being against the will of the person
if. on the other hand, the admissible loss of nationality is also explicitly possible against
the will of the person by the black letter of the constitution. 66
Another argument in favor of the second opinion can be found in a German
Federal Constitutional Court decision. In the decision, the court stated that a deprivation
is "a special kind of loss of nationality that cannot be influenced by the affected
person." For these reasons, the second view is favorable and therefore a deprivation
can only be assumed if the loss of nationality is unavoidable.
If this standard is applied to the new code sections here in question, one reaches
the conclusion that the foreign national who loses his or her old nationality or the German
nationality conferred upon him by the new citizenship law can influence the decision. He
or she can choose to keep the German nationality by virtue of § 29 (3) StAG. This
" ld
66
See Smaluhn, supra note 1 1 , at 98.
67
BVerfGE, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 43 (1990), 2193 (2193).
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regular case is clearly an example in which the loss of the German nationality is
avoidable by choosing to keep it. Therefore, it cannot constitute a deprivation in the
z o
meaning of article 16 (1) of the German constitution.
Furthermore, according to the second sentence of the new § 29 (2) StAG, German
nationality is also lost if the person negligently forgets about or purposefully ignores the
duty to choose between the nationalities. In this case there also seems to be no cause for
assuming a deprivation because the person can influence the decision by her behavior. If
he or she decides to keep the German nationality, that is always possible. Thus, the loss
resulting from inaction is not unavoidable and therefore not a deprivation.
However, one also has to consider the case where the person applies for retention
of double nationality according to § 29 (3) StAG via one of the exceptions in § 87 AuslG
and cannot receive permission because of special details in the foreign law that will
prevent the assumption of a "hardship" within the meaning of those exceptions explained
above. It has been said that this will constitute a deprivation within the meaning of
article 16 (1) GG because the resulting loss of German nationality would not only occur
against the person's will and couldn't be influenced by him or her. 70 Therefore, it has to
be considered unavoidable and thus constitutes a deprivation. 71
On the other hand, one has to see that the person can very well influence the
decision which offers a chance for retaining German nationality because this case can
only arise if the person files an application for receiving permission.
68
Scholz & Uhle, supra note 1 5, at 1 5 1 5.
See discussion supra Part I.B.2.a).
70
Scholz & Uhle, supra note 15, at 1515.
71
Id
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In other words, the person- could just refrain from filing the application and decide
to retain only German nationality. By deciding to file the application, the person actively
influences the process and consequently jeopardizes the retention of his or her German
nationality because of the new law, but the alternative to give up German nationality is
always available. All in all, the new regulation can not be considered to constitute an
inadmissible deprivation within the meaning of article 16(1) GG. " From this viewpoint,
the law must be considered to be constitutional.
b) The issue concerning article 16 GG and the introduction of the ius soli principle
The next question that is raised by article 16 GG is whether this provision
prohibits the above-mentioned introduction of the ius soli principle. It has been said
that article 16 GG incorporated existing citizenship law when the constitution was
drafted.
74
Since there can be no doubt that the ius sanguinis principle was predominant at
this time, that interpretation of the constitution would prohibit any change in principle
and would therefore invalidate the ius soli introduction. This opinion would only leave
room for a "change within the system". 75
However, this opinion is not supported by facts. First, one has to mention that the
text of article 16(1) GG says nothing about double nationality, which is a typical result
of a mixed system involving both the ius soli and the ius sanguinis principle.
Even one of the authors who classified the provision to be an unconstitutional deprivation earlier has
obviously changed his mind and has meanwhile reached the conclusion that the new citizenship law is not
in conflict with Art. 16 (1), see Scholz, supra note 14, at 175.
73
See discussion supra Part I.A. 1
.
74 Klaus Stern, III/l Das Staatsrecht Der Bundesrepublik. Deutschland [The Public Law of The
Federal Republic Of Germany] 814(1988); Scholz & Uhle, supra note 15, at 1511.
75
Cf. Mararov & von Mangoldt, supra note 61, at 6.
76
See Hailbronner, supra note 45, at 53.
77
See MAUNZ, supra note 1 0, at 26
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Article 16 deals with the deprivation or loss of German nationality with respect to
an individual, but not with an abandonment or change of principle. It therefore seems
unclear from which part of the formulation the opposing view seems to infer a prohibition
of the introduction of ius soli elements.
79
If the constitution protects the substantive
SO
content of German nationality at all. the provision to examine is article 1 16 GG. This
was also stated by the German Federal Constitution Court, which decided that "the
constitution leaves it to the federal legislature -as article 73 Nr.2 and article 116 GG
indicate-" how the regulation of the citizenship law should be shaped. The fact that the
court failed to mention article 16 GG with respect to the conditions for the acquisition
and the loss of nationality presents another argument why article 16 (1) GG has nothing
to do with this field of citizenship law.
In conclusion it can be said that the above-mentioned introduction of the ius soli
does not conflict with article 16 GG. One can assume that the newly enacted citizenship
law does not conflict with article 16 GG. It is not unconstitutional for this particular
reason.
2. Possible Violation of article 20 GG
Another reason for constitutional concern has been found in the provision of
article 20 GG, which contains a multitude of constitutional principles. A possible
violation of any of these principles has given substantial rise to concerns in connection
with the new citizenship law.
78 MAKAROV & VON MANGOLDT, supra note 61, at 7.
9
Smaluhn, supra note 1 1, at 99.
Mararov & von Mangoldt, supra note 61, at 7.
81 BVerfGE 83, 37 (52).
24
a) Principle of democracy, article 20 (2) GG
According to article 20 (2) of the constitution, Germany is a federal democratic
state. The people have universal power that is executed in democratic elections and
votes.
82
In the discussion process concerning the new citizenship law, both the
supporters and opponents of double nationality have used this principle to support their
•
• 83
positions.
One opinion points out that the increasing number of people with both a German
and a foreign nationality would allow foreign minorities to establish a separate group in
the federal parliament because § 6 (6) of the Federal Election Code.
84
This code section
would permit such a group to be represented in the parliament even without the
requirement of reaching at least five percent of the votes. Furthermore it has been
stated that a profound change by the legislature itself in the body of the people who are to
elect the legislature is against the principles of democracy.
Apart from the fact that this opinion fails to explain why the representation of a
minority in the federal parliament would be detrimental and a cause for concern, it has to
be noted that the cited provision from the Federal Election Code is only applicable to
national minorites that reside in a self-contained area. If one considers these arguments
in light of the analysis about how many people the new citizenship law will affect, they
lose much of their force.
82 GG art. 20 (2) S. 1 (F.R.G.).
83
Smaluhn, supra note 1 1, at 103.
84
§ 6 (6) BUNDESWAHLGESETZ [FEDERAL ELECTION Code] (F.R.G.) [hereinafter BWahlG].
Scholz & Uhle, supra note 15, at 1516 n. 70. Further reference of this opinion can be found in Smaluhn.
supra note 1 1. at 104 n. 93.
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See Scholz & Uhle, supra note 15. at 1516 n. 70.
Smaluhn, supra note 1 1, at 104.
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The Turkish, Greek Italian, and Portuguese will be likely to profit the most from
the new rule as far as the number of people with double nationality are concerned. They
don't reside in a self-contained area, therefore the above-mentioned § 6 (6) BWahlG is
not even applicable.
Furthermore, the idea of having the legislature to decide who is capable of voting
is an indispensable element of federal government structure. Who else would be fit to
delineate the people having the capacity to vote than the federal legislature?
Additionally, the capacity to vote is also limited by age and legal capacity already.
Certainly nobody would consider it unconstitutional if the minimum age were changed
even though this would also exclude numerous people and would also constitute a
decision of the legislative body about who is eligible to vote for its formation.
Furthermore, the constitution itself acknowledges the right of the federal
legislature to enact a Federal Election Code90 and of course one of the major issues in
such a code must be a determination about who possesses the capacity to vote. Again,
the case of establishing a certain voting age seems no different than establishing
requirements as to which persons will be considered "German"' and thus will be eligible
to vote. In more articulated terms, trying to make a distinction between keeping someone
from voting because of racial origin on the basis of defending the ius sanguinis principle
and the establishment of age requirements would seem to be somewhat nationalistic.
Furthermore, the German Federal Constitution Court has itself made a statement
about how the legislature should handle the establishment of a citizenship law that would
88
§ 12 BWahlG (F.R.G.).
89
§ 13(1) BWahlG (F.R.G).
90 GG art. 73 Nr.2 (F.R.G.)
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meet the requirements for being upheld in view of democratic principles. In a decision
about the ability of foreigners to vote in a municipal election, the court stated that "it
correlates with the democratic idea, especially with its idea of freedom, if a congruity
between the people who bear political rights and those who are indefinitely subject to a
particular public authority would be reached."91 Even though the following statement
also said that this was only true as a "starting point" for legislative activity, it can be
assumed that citizenship law must be the arena where the legislature reacts to a change in
the composition and ethnical structure of the population in order to include more
inhabitants in the democratic process. A statement against double nationality can
certainly not be inferred from the Federal Constitution Court's decision.
9 On the
contrary', the decision seems to suggest that the democracy principle is one reason for
establishing a congruity between the people who are able to vote and the total number of
inhabitants in Germany.
b) Principle of regularity of law, article 20 (3) GG
Another criticism of the new citizenship law is an alleged violation of the
principle of regularity of law.
94
This principle is set forth in article 20 (3) of the
constitution * and is binding on all legislative acts. One of the many aspects of this
principle is the requirement of clarity and definiteness. This requires all legislation to be
worded in definite and clear terms in order to give the citizen a clear and comprehensible
91 BVerfGE 83, 52(1990).
92
See id.
93
See. Hailbronner, supra note 45, at 53.
The concept is somewhat similar to the Anglo-Saxon principle of "rule of law" but to some extent
different and a German specialty. See Maunz, supra note 10, § Art.20 p. 258.
95 GG art. 20 (3) (F.R.G.).
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idea of the content and requirements of the law.
96
In fact, this principle can even be
qualified as one the most important requirements of the facets contained in the due course
of law principle.
The exceptions of § 87 AuslG
98 have especially been claimed to be in violation of
the principle of clarity and definiteness,
99
obviously because of their rather general terms
"'disproportionate difficulties" and "'unbearable hardship."
10C However, this opinion
ignores the fact that law has to be written in general terms and the German Federal
Constitution Court has repeatedly emphasized that the requirement of clarity and
definiteness does not prevent the legislator from using fairly general terms and even
broad general clauses.
101
Additionally, the Federal Constitution Court has stated that
only in extremely exceptional cases will a statute be declared to be unconstitutionally
vague.
10
" In practical terms, the court has been extremely liberal with the requirement of
clarity and definiteness and has in fact never invalidated any statute on the grounds of
being too indefinite.
104
Furthermore, this criticism is virtually self-defeating if one
considers the terminology in the old version of § 87 AuslG. There, the term "unbearable
hardship" was already used 1(b and some of the people who are now calling upon the
requirement of clarity and definiteness were at the time of its enactment a famous
96 MAUNZ, supra note 94, at 284; STERN, supra note 12, at 829.
97
See STERN, supra note 12, at 829.
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.a).
99 Scholz& Uhle, supra note 15, at 1516.
100
Cf. Scholz, supra note 14, at 176.
101 BVerfGE 3, 225 (243); BVerfGE 13, 153 (161); BVerfGE 21, 73 (79); BVerfGE 31, 255 (264).
102 BVerfGE 1,14 (45); BVerfGE 25, 216 (227).
103
See Stern, supra note 12, at 829.
104
Id. at 830.
See the old § 87 (1) (4) AuslG (F.R.G.). For a reprinted version of the code section which is displaced
by the new see Makarov & VON MANGOLDT, supra note 42, at 1
.
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member of the federal parliament, 106 thus assenting to a terminology that he now deems
to be unconstitutional. In other words, the criticism of the new law seems to be
motivated more by political or even nationalistic resentment than by constitutional
considerations and cannot be taken seriously. If one also considers the reluctance of the
Federal Constitutional Court, it seems virtually impossible that the new law can be
declared unconstitutionally vague.
3. The principles of International law. article 25 GG
Another reason for concern can be found in article 25 of the constitution.
According to this provision, general principles of international law prevail over German
legislation, including federal legislation.
107
These general principles prevent the
I AO
legislature from enacting conflicting citizenship legislation. It has already been
pointed out that the general introduction of the ius soli principle with the result of a
combined system together with the ius sanguinis principle is possible according to the
rules of international law.
109
a) The Convention on Reduction of cases of multiple nationality ( 1 963)
However, Germany is a party to the Convention on Reduction of Cases of
Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality. 110 The
international law issues are therefore if this convention is relevant under article 25 GG.
106
Rupert Scholz has been a member of the CDU parliamentary group since the 1980s and has been in the
federal government for some time. He is one of the most influential politicians of the CDLTs right wing and
must have had knowledge of the general terminology of the old § 87 (1) Nr.4 AuslG.
107 GG art. 25 (F.R.G.).
See Smaluhn, supra note 1 1, at 99.
See supra text accompanying note 1 1
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See Gesetz zu dem Obereinkommen vom 6. Mai 1963 iiber die Verringerung der Mehrstaatigkeit und
iiber die Wehrpflicht von Mehrstaatern v. 29.9.1969 (BGB1. II S. 1953-1962) and the English text of the
convention printed in Europ. T.S. No. 43 (1963).
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If it is. it must be scrutinized whether the convention restricts the legislature in the
creation of the new citizenship law."
1 The starting point of a possible objection against
the new citizenship law can be found in the principle of pacta sunt servanda, which is
also applicable in international law.
112
Consequently, the content of every international
treaty would fall within the scope of article 25 GG.
llj
In the light of this consideration, a
closer look at the convention is necessary. According to article 1 (1) of the convention,
"nationals of the Contracting Parties who are of full age and who acquire of their own
free will, by means of naturalisation, option or recovery, the nationality of another Party
shall lose their former nationality. They shall not be authorised to retain their former
nationality/'
114
The same principle of generally losing the former nationality also applies
for minor children. "
First of all, one has to note that for the biggest group of potential double nationals
who obtain their nationality by virtue of the new § 4 (3) StAG and the introduction of the
ius soli principle, article 1 of the convention does not even apply. As stated above, its
scope is limited to people who acquire the nationality of another state by "naturalisation,
option or recovery." Of course the double nationality conferred upon the person by
virtue of § 4 (3) StAG can only be retained by an option to keep the double nationality
and a subsequent permission to keep it. 6 However, article 1 of the convention clearly
speaks only of the acquisition of the nationality. Any child who acquires his or her
double nationality by virtue of § 4 (3) StAG does so by virtue of birth and not through
111
Cf. Smaluhn, supra note 1 1, at 100.
112
See 3 Theodor Maunz et al.. Grundgesetz Kommentar [A Commentary On The Constitution]
§ Art. 25, p. 16 (Matthias Herdegen et al. eds., 35th update 1999).
113 BGH St 5, 396(402).
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either naturalization, option or recovery. In other words, the new citizenship law
concerns the acquisition of double nationality by virtue of birth whereas article 1 of the
convention only prohibits the retention by exercising an option. Therefore, article 1 is
not in contradiction with the new law. The only possible conflict concerns the general
aim of the convention to reduce cases of double nationality. According to the
introduction of the convention, the contracting countries considered that "cases of
multiple nationality are liable to cause difficulties and that joint action to reduce as far as
possible the number of cases of multiple nationality, as between member States,
corresponds to the aims of the Council of Europe".
With this in mind, there is still one group to whom the convention fully applies.
According to the new naturalization rule of § 40 b StAG, minor children can obtain
double nationality by applying for permission to keep their former nationality by virtue of
§ 29 (1) and (3) StAG in connection with § 87 AuslG. In these cases, a conflict between
the convention and the newly enacted law clearly exists. However, the contracting states
have been reluctant to apply article 1 of the convention with regard to the acquisition of a
nationality by naturalization. Only Austria and Luxembourg have applied article 1 of the
convention in these cases but this is not an indication of all the other contracting states
being in breach of the convention.
115
See article 1 (2) printed at id
116
See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
See Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of
Multiple Nationality, Europ. T.S. No. 43 (1963).
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Smaluhn, supra note 1 1 , at 101.
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According to article 31 (3) (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
when interpreting a treaty there "shall be taken into account, together with the context
any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement
of the parties regarding its interpretation."
119
All countries who strictly apply article 1 of
the Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality thereby lay the foundation
for a "subsequent practice" within the meaning of article 31 (3) (b) of the Vienna
Convention.
The few countries that apply article 1 of the first convention without any
restrictions simply seem to make use of another provision in that convention namely
article 4. According to that article of the Convention on Reduction of Cases with
Multiple Nationality, nothing in the provisions of the convention "shall preclude the
application of any provision more likely to limit the occurrence of multiple nationality
whether embodied or subsequently introduced into either the municipal law of any other
1 T I
treaty, convention or agreement between two or more of the Contracting Parties."
In other words, these countries are simply exceeding the standards of subsequent
practice, which have been established by all countries willing to restrict the application of
article 1 of the convention. Consequently, it follows that the convention does not require
Germany to avoid multiple nationality in cases of naturalization. 122
The English text of the convention is reprinted in Gesetz zu dem Wiener Ubereinkommen vom 23. Mai
120
969 iiber das Recht der Vertrage v. 3.8.1985 (BGB1. II S. 939) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
Smaluhn, supra note 1 1 , at 101.
See article 4 of the Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations
in Cases of Multiple Nationality, Europ. T.S. No. 43.
" See Smaluhn, supra note 1 1 , at 101.
With respect to the newly enacted citizenship law, this fact eliminates any
possible conflict between the Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality
and the naturalization offered by § 40 b StAG.
Despite all this, some have labeled the new naturalization provision as an "evident
violation" of the convention.
123 With regard to numbers however, one has to note that the
new § 40 b StAG will most likely affect nearly as many people as the introduction of the
ius soli principle will.
124
Therefore, if one is willing to see a conflict between the
convention and the new citizenship law, it is a very small one since various European
countries, which are also parties to the convention, have also accepted double nationality.
In addition to that, a direct conflict between the most important provision of the
convention and the most important sections of the new citizenship law cannot be found.
At the very best, there is a conflict between the aim of the convention and the impact of
the new law.
b) The relation between article 25 and 59 GG and its impact on constitutionality
Even if one is willing to see a conflict, the question remains whether this fact will
give rise to unconstitutionality by virtue of article 25 GG. As mentioned above, the
principle of pacta sunt servanda could lead to the assumption that every breach of an
international agreement, however slight, will constitute a violation of article 25 GG.
However, if that standard would be applied, every international convention or treaty
would supersede contradicting federal law in every case and without exception. For that
reason, everyone agrees that article 59 (2) GG is lex specialis to article 25 GG. This
'^Scholz&Uhle, supra note 15, at 1514 n. 58.
See discussion supra Part II.A. 2.
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opinion points out that article 25 GG includes only "general principles'' and states that a
treaty, however international it is purported to be, is at least in principle only applicable
between its signatories.
1 5
Therefore, the German Federal Constitution court has stated that the constitution
(in accepting principles of international law) does not put this task into practice by
binding the federal legislature to every single international treaty and thereby forcing
every treaty deviation to be unconstitutional.
12
In other words, even a federal law
plainly contradicting an international convention might be in violation of international
law, however it cannot be considered unconstitutional on the grounds of a violation of
article 25 GG.
Additionally, one can infer from a statement of the Federal Administrative Court
that the only possible violation, namely the contradiction between the aim of the
convention and the introduction of the ius soli principle, cannot be a basis for a violation
of article 25 GG. In a 1971 decision, the court admittedly stated that "one of the
internationally recognized goals of citizenship law is the utmost avoidance of double
nationality. " However, it also stated this goal "does not belong to the general principles
protected by article 25 GG". In conclusion, the result must be that there is no conflict
between article 25 GG and the newly enacted citizenship law.
4. The nation state principle and article 1 16 GG
Another cause for constitutional concern can be found in the nation state principle
and article 1 1 6 GG. It has been said that the constitution contains the principle of a
See Smaluhn, supra note 1 1, at 100.
126 BVerfGE 6, 309 (362).
127 BVerwG, JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ], 38 (1972), 158 (159).
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nation state, which limits the discretion that the legislature has in shaping the German
citizenship law.
128 However, this opinion contradicts the clear language in the new
preamble of the constitution, according to which Germany views itself as an "equal
member of a unified Europe". 129 In 1990, the federal legislature did away with the old
formulation which had as one of its primary tasks to maintain and save the national unity.
This original goal was not aimed at saving cultural values and excluding foreigners from
obtaining German citizenship, but rather directed toward German reunification.
13 Now
that reunification has been achieved, the federal legislature is therefore not bound to
maintain the classic principle of the nation state.
131
Furthermore, the opinion collides with article 24 (1) of the constitution according
to which the federal legislature can transfer sovereignty rights to a supranational
institution. In accordance with the growing concept of international interdependency,
it must be said that the constitution clearly turned its back on the concept of the nation
state. If this is the case, there can be no conflict between the new citizenship law and a
principle that has been abandoned by the constitution.
However, another serious constitutionality issue can be found in article 1 16 of the
constitution. That provision decides who is part of the German nation. The Federal
Constitution Court has pointed out that it is this particular provision which expresses the
See Albert Bleckmann, Anwartschaft auf die deutsche Staatsangehorigkeit 9 [Is there an expectancy-
right to German citizenship 7], NEUE JURJSTISCHE WOCHENSCHR1FT [NJW] 1397, 1398 (1990).
The full text of the constitution's preamble can be found in article 4 of the reunification treaty printed in:
Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik iiber die
Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands - Einigungsvertrag- v. 31.8.1990 (BGB1. II S. 890).
See Smaluhn, supra note 1 1, at 103.
131
Id.
132 GG art. 24 (F.R.G.).
133
See STERN, supra note 12, at 516-17.
national affiliation, which is conferred upon somebody by German citizenship. 1
4
The
provision includes the so-called "status Germans" in the German nation.
The Federal Administrative Court has pointed out that a person is a member of the
German nation who acknowledges German characteristics if this is backed up by certain
connecting factors as descent, language, education and culture.
J
" A person that wants to
be recognized as a German national must therefore have identified him or herself with
German culture also providing supporting proof, so it is fair to say that article 116 (1)
attaches great value to a cultural connection.
136
This connection might not necessarily be
present with people who are simply born on German soil, so at first blush the introduction
of the ius soli principle could be objectionable on the grounds of violating article 1 16 of
the constitution.
On the other hand, it has been said that the requirement of German nationality
only applies to refugees and banished or exiled people but not to their spouses or
descendants. Thus, article 1 16 of the constitution can also grant German nationality to
people who do not identify with German culture. Therefore, article 1 1 6 does not limit the
group of potential citizens to people with certain German cultural characteristics. 138 The
article is an exceptional provision designed to deal with the specific circumstances after
1 1Q
the Second World War. It is located in a part of the constitution that contains
transitional provisions and might be deleted one day.
134 BVerfGE 83, 37(51).
l35 BVerwGE5,239(240).
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For this particular reason, an argument a maiore ad minus cannot be made with
respect to the German citizenship of persons not covered by article 116. It therefore
has to be pointed out that article 1 1 6 of the constitution does not control the requirements
of citizenship acquisition and cannot be in conflict with the new regulations set forth in
the StAG.
5. Principle of equality in article 3 GG
Another cause for constitutional concern is the principle of equality that is laid
down in article 3 of the constitution. This article formulates the general requirement of
equal treatment and according of the interpretation of the Federal Constitution Court it
calls for equal treatment of comparable issues and also for unequal treatment of unequal
issues.
141
This duty also applies to the legislature.
142 As described above, 143 the new
citizenship law splits the inhabitants into "pure" Germans and Germans who have a
double nationality.
As one of the many results of this change, double nationals will have the
opportunity to vote twice. Because similarly situated Germans can only vote once, it has
been said that the new citizenship law is unconstitutional because of a violation of article
3 of the constitution.
145
This can have extremely adverse effects within the European
Union. Since EU countries are so closely bound together, a person with multiple
nationalities who has the chance for multiple votes could gain an unfair proportion of
140
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voting power. However, the principle of equality is not violated if the legislature has a
reasonable justification for the unequal treatment.
146
Since the unequal treatment here
deals with the comparability of two groups ofpersons, the so-called "new formula" of the
Federal Constitution Court
147
would require extremely important reasons for an unequal
treatment.
148
In considering the new citizenship law. a reasonable justification for the
introduction of the ius soli principle might be found in the goal of better integrating
foreign children of the second and third generation into German society.
These particular foreigners, who are born in Germany and have been living there
without significant interruptions, generally do not retain a bond or connection with their
homeland anymore. They are born into German society and most speak German better
than their parents' language. Their integration begins at birth, so the only difference
between them and "native" Germans is the different passport. In the interest of equal
opportunity it therefore seems necessary to confer German nationality upon them by
virtue of birth. This would promote integration because the feeling of cultural
togetherness would most likely increase. 5
Furthermore, the granting of double nationality can be justified by the simple fact
that despite all integration efforts, especially children of the second and third generation
cannot be considered to be completely integrated because of the remaining difference in
nationality. Without an amendment of citizenship laws, this development is also likely to
increase. The globalization of commerce and societies together with the growing number
46
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of transnational people cannot be without impact on citizenship law. " No less than 7
million foreigners are currently domiciled in Germany, representing almost 10 percent of
the overall population. Many of these people are foreign children of the second and third
generation who have grown up in Germany and consider it their home state. These facts
were grossly disregarded by the old citizenship law and should not be ignored.
The increasing movement of people all over the European continent was
obviously acknowledged by some states that signed the second amendment to the
Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality. 153 According to the
preamble of the amendment, there are a large number of migrants who have settled
permanently in the member states of the Council of Europe and there is a need to
complete their integration, particularly in the case of second-generation migrants.
154
In
the various host states, this can be achieved through the acquisition of the nationality of
the host state but the conservation of the nationality of origin is deemed as an important
factor in achieving these objectives. 155 Therefore, article 1 of the original convention was
supplemented by three subsections. Subsection 7 of the new convention states that minor
children can now maintain their former nationality in case of naturalization by a host
state.
156
One important argument raised against the introduction of double nationality on a
broader basis is the contention of an impending loyalty conflict caused by double
See Hailbronner, supra note 45, at 54.
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nationality.
157
However, the danger of unsolvable loyalty conflicts has been more of a
problem in connection with military duties, such as in the war between the United States
and Great Britain in 1812. With respect to "impending" double nationals who possess
the citizenship of Italy, Greece, Portugal or Turkey, the possibility of loyalty conflicts
seems to be rather remote due to the increasing military and political cooperation
between those countries and Germany. Besides, loyalty conflicts are not at all
excluded by staying away from the ius soli principle. A person is unlikely to forget her
origin even if she gets naturalized and completely abandons her former nationality. If an
impending loyalty conflict would be of paramount importance, it would follow that
nobody could be naturalized anymore. Obviously, this is a view which cannot be
seriously adhered to. 159
Finally, a decision of the Federal Constitutional court has been quoted as
precedent supposedly opposing the introduction of legislation which would allow double
nationality to a greater extent.
16C
In the decision, the court held that "domestically as
well as internationally double or multiple nationality is seen as an evil which has to be
eliminated in the interest of the states and the affected citizens." 161 Even though this
formula has been cited in subsequent decisions of the Federal Administrative Court 162
and by opponents of double nationality, 163 it cannot be said that it established a
Scholz & Uhle, supra note 15, at 1512; Hans von Mangoldt, Offentlich-rechtliche und volkerrechtliche
Probleme mehrfacher Staatsangehorigkeit aus deutscher Sicht [Public and International Law problems of
multiple nationalityfrom the German perspective], 48 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 965, 967 (1993).
See Hailbronner, supra note 45, at 55.
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constitutional principle that is still valid today.
164 On the contrary, the court pointed out
in the decision that the disadvantages of double nationality cannot be decisive against an
additional acquisition of the maternal nationality. It indicated furthermore that double
nationality could also have advantages, such as the enjoyment by the affected person of
equal rights in either of the home states. 165 Additionally, the '*evil doctrine"' of the
Federal Constitution Court merely points out that double nationality can lead to factual
and legal problems and was therefore undesired for reasons of legal policy at the time of
the decision.
1
These considerations are not necessarily still valid today.
In this context, one should see that the comparable citizenship law of other
countries and international law has changed. Many European states have already enacted
legislation about the acquisition of the host state's nationality with special emphasis on
the descendants of foreign immigrants that allows these persons to retain their old
nationality. The above-mentioned second amendment of 1993 was already a step away
from the original intention of reducing double nationality cases, but it was not the last.
The latest development has been a European convention draft concerning citizenship
from November 6, 1997.
This convention, which has been signed by various European Union member
states, gives the contracting parties broad discretion with regard to allowing naturalized
persons retain their double nationality. All in all, this change in legal practice and
attitude towards double nationality throughout Europe must lead to the conclusion that
See Hailbronner, supra note 45, at 52.
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the old "evil doctrine" is no longer valid because there is no general rejection of double
nationality anymore.
In conclusion, all the named factors, which lead to an acceptance of double
nationality, do not prohibit the introduction of the ius soli principle. On the contrary, the
important task of integrating a great number of second and third generation foreign
nationals into German society is a very important reason that justifies the advantages that
result from double nationality. Since this justifies the unequal treatment of foreigners
who are also Germans, the new citizenship law must be deemed in accordance with the
requirements of article 3 (1) of the German constitution.
6. The principle of special protection of marriage and family in article 6(1) GG
The last constitutional aspect of the new citizenship law can be seen in connection
with article 6 (1) of the German constitution. According to this provision, marriage and
1 70
family are subject to special protection of the public order. From this provision, it
might be inferred that there is a requirement of unity within the family with respect to
citizenship and nationality. 171 A decision of the Federal Constitution Court has given rise
to a discussion as to whether such a unity principle exists and therefore prevents the
introduction of the ius soli principle. In the decision, the Court held that the "common
link to a particular state or nation constitutes a part of the multiple and close relations
between parents and their children and contributes to the unity of the family." 172
However, the court itself limits the goal of citizenship unity and points out that such unity
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is merely "desirable".
173
In subsequent decisions the court clarified that article 6 (1) of
the constitution does not call for such a unity.
174
It is evident that the family is a private
entity that can exist without the state. The bonds within the family are more of a personal
than of a legal nature. It is unlikely that these bonds will be disturbed by a difference in
nationality. If at all, the introduction of a "pure" ius soli principle could be considered
difficult in the light of the Federal Constitution Court's decision.
176
Therefore,
article 6(1) of the constitution does not require a unity within the family with respect to
nationality or citizenship. Thus, the introduction of the ius soli principle does not conflict
with this particular provision either.
D. Conclusion
The new citizenship law does not conflict with the constitution, so the conclusion
must be that the new citizenship law is likely to withstand the constitutionality challenge.
Thus, by the introduction of the ius soli principle, there will be a significant increase in
the number of inhabitants with double nationality. This will pose significant problems
for German Private International Law, which uses nationality as the predominant
connecting factor in ascertaining the person's personal status.
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Chapter III-
The solution under the current German Private International Law
As a result of the introduction of the ius soli principle and increased naturalization
possibilities, there will an increasing number of people will possess both German and one
(or more) foreign nationalities. The problem of determining a person's personal status
who has double or multiple nationality is dealt with in article 5 of the German Private
International Law Code, the EGBGB. To connect a double national with a particular
legal order, German Private International Law generally uses the concept of the
1 77
"effective nationality" which is determined by habitual residence and the course of the
person's life. However, the general rule is displaced by the second sentence of article
5 (1) EGBGB if one of the nationalities is German. In this case, "that legal status has
precedence" and the person's personal status is judged according to German Private
law.
179
A. Impacts of the new citizenship law on the application of article 5 (1) EGBGB
For the double nationals affected by the new citizenship law, the impact will be
quite severe. Their personal status will be judged according to German law in the fields
Although the provision of article 5(1) EGBGB does not use the term "effective nationality" this is the
common label for the principle set forth in the statute. See Otto Palandt, BURGERLICHES Gesetzbuch,
[Civil CODE] 2304 (Andreas Heldrich et al. eds., 58th ed. 1999).
178 EGBGB art. 5 ( 1 ) (F.R.G.). Translation by SIMON L. GOREN, THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE 434 ( 1 994).
179
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of marriage conclusion and its legal consequences, marital property regime,
divorce,
183
guardianship and attendance, 184 the right of succession,
185
basic legal capacity
1 RA 1 87
and capacity to enter into legal transactions, and the right to bear a name. There are
only minor exceptions to the general rule of the second sentence of article 5(1) EGBGB.
1 88
such as the right to bear a common name between spouses and the right to choose the
1 8Q
marital property regime. In these few cases, the spouses can choose the applicable law
even if it is not the law of the "effective'" nationality or German law.
Altogether, it can be said that this sentence of article 5 (1) EGBGB will affect a
significant number of people since it declares German law to be applicable for the
personal status of all inhabitants that will profit from the introduction of the ius soli
principle in the new citizenship law. As mentioned above, at least until the age of
twenty-three, double nationality will be the general result of the new § 4 (3) StAG. The
second sentence of article 5(1) EGBGB must therefore offer a practicable and just
solution for the "problem" of double nationality.
180 EGBGB art. 13 (1) (F.R.G.).
181 EGBGB art. 14 (1) (F.R.G.).
182 EGBGB art. 15 (1) (F.R.G.).
183 EGBGB art. 17 (1) (F.R.G.).
184 EGBGB art. 24(1) (F.R.G.).
185 EGBGB art. 25(1) (F.R.G.).
186 EGBGB art. 7(1) (F.R.G.).
187 EGBGB art. 10 (1) (F.R.G.).
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[Problems of double nationality' with respect to German Private International Law], 48 JUR1STENZEITUNG
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B. Evaluation of the current article 5 (1) EGBGB - Time for a change?
In order to determine whether this particular part of the provision is fit to accept
the challenge of a far broader application scope, its merits and drawbacks have to be
analyzed.
1 . The practical viewpoint: increased application of the lexfori
From the practical viewpoint of the German courts, the general application of
German substantive law in all cases involving double nationality has an undeniable
advantage. Since foreign substantive law will no longer be applicable, the provision will
reduce the amount of complicated and lengthy work in finding and interpreting foreign
law.
191
Naturally, the German judge knows his or her legal system naturally much better
than a foreign set of rules and the process of finding that foreign law can be long and
costly.
According to the Code of Civil Procedure, laws of another state "require proof
only to such extent as they are unknown to the court. In the ascertainment of these legal
norms, the court is not limited to the evidence offered by the parties; it is empowered to
make use of other sources of knowledge and to direct whatever is necessary for the
purpose of such utilization."
192
The provision sounds as if the ascertainment of foreign
law is an exception, which only applies if the court does not have sufficient knowledge
about the foreign law.
However, one has to note that particularly international marriage cases, which
form the largest group of "international cases" in the field of personal status, are always
191
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decided by first instance courts.
193 The judges sitting in these courts have little
knowledge about private international law let alone about foreign substantial law because
private international and comparative law have never been mandatory subjects at the time
of their education.
194
Furthermore, the code provision also leaves room for having
material about foreign law submitted by the parties. This will either require long and
expensive research by a rather "domestic" lawyer or hiring a rather expensive
experienced international lawyer and does not contribute to a fast and efficient course of
the judicial process. Additionally, if the court decides that it cannot ascertain the foreign
law itself, a difficult and very lengthy process starts to obtain the information from
foreign countries. According to the European Convention on Information on Foreign
Law, it involves a transmission over "receiving agencies" 195 and "transmitting
agencies", as well as a lot of translation.
In conclusion, it must therefore be said that the resulting increase in the
application of the lex fori will be a benefit from the practical viewpoint.
2. The ideal of achieving unanimous results by courts in different jurisdictions
However, there will be also significant downsides. Many countries prefer the
same solution as the second sentence of article 5(1) EGBGB and set up rigid rules.
According to § 23b GVG (F.R.G.) first instance municipal courts take jurisdiction over all family law
cases.
This experience has been made inter alia by the author of this thesis who was once instructed to find out
about the substantive law of Russia during his mandatory traineeship period at such a municipal court. The
judge did not fail to mention that he knew nothing about this subject since he never had to study Private
International Law during his university time.
See article 2 (1) of the convention reprinted in Gesetz zu dem Europaischen Ubereinkommen vom 7.
Juni 1968 betreffend Auskiinfte iiber auslandisches Recht [Law enacting the European Convention on
Information on Foreign Law] v. 5.7.1974 (BGB1. II S.938).
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which also let the domestic law have unlimited precedence over any foreign law in cases
involving double nationality. 198 For example, Turkish
199
as well as Greek, Spanish and
Portuguese law have provisions similar to article 5(1)EGBGB that also lead to the
applicability of their substantive law.
200
This jeopardizes one of the major ideals in
Private International Law.
201 The greatest mind in the field of German Private
International Law, Friedrich Karl von Savigny, wrote already in the 1 9th Century that it
was a "desirable and accomplishable goal to have a conformity of decisions in different
States.'^ The paramount value of this principle is undisputed among legal scholars203
and courts.
Laws like the second sentence of article (1) EGBGB jeopardize this principle
because each of the States will consider the double national to be subject to its own set of
rules without considering which of the nationalities might be the effective one. 205 In other
words, the divergence between each country will defeat one of the major principles206 of
Private International Law. Consequently, this has been well characterized "the central
problem'' of an increase of inhabitants with double nationality.
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In many cases, such a result would give an incentive to the plaintiff to choose
between the different jurisdictions and bring a lawsuit in the country that will decide
according to the rules most favorable to him {forum shopping)." Furthermore, the
divergence would increase the danger of "limping legal relations'' which are
characterized by the fact that one jurisdiction considers the legal relation (for instance a
marriage) to be valid whereas another does not. ° This will have severe negative
impacts in the field of legal capacity,
210
the right to bear a name,
211
marriage relations212
and the right of succession. 213
For all these reasons, it can be said that the advantage of a more frequent
application of the lex fori is already overcompensated by the greater disadvantage of
jeopardizing the high ideal of achieving unanimous results by courts in different
jurisdictions.
3. The change in status caused by the new § 29 StAG
One of the side effects of the new citizenship law and article 5(1) EGBGB will be
that the personal status of the affected people will change according to the new
§ 29 StAG after they either exercise their option to retain either one of their nationalities
or after they automatically lose one of their nationalities at the age of twenty-three. 214
This change of status will not occur as a result of a change in facts which lead to a
different connection with a certain jurisdiction, but will occur by virtue of passive
208
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209
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behavior if the person fails to exercise its option and loses the German nationality at the
age of twenty-three.
215
This means that foreign law will be applicable even though the
affected person has taken no active step towards the foreign legal system. On the
contrary, the connecting factor of habitual residence remains unchanged and there is no
discernable justification for the change of status." ' If one is willing to use the words of
Savigny, a change in status without a change in the attitude towards a legal system
without a change in location fails the task of finding the legal system with which the legal
• • • 1 \ 1
relation has the closest connection or in which it is situated.
Furthermore, it has been said that the new law will have a tendency to produce
arbitrary results which will be easy to manipulate. If a couple with common double
nationality gets married before either of them turns twenty-three and before exercising
the option to choose only one of the nationalities, German law will be applicable by
virtue of article 13(1) and the second sentence of article 5 (1) EGBGB. If they decide to
wait until they are both twenty-three, the foreign law will be applicable since the German
nationality ceases to exist. Thus, the requirements of the marriage will depend on the age
of the persons and can be manipulated.
This possibility is even available at an earlier point because the prospective
spouses are already under a duty to choose one of their nationalities (German or foreign)
to be effective when they reach the age of eighteen. 219 Therefore, the "option" to choose
either German or foreign law to be applicable for their marriage is already at their
See Gruber, supra note 3, at 428.
216
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disposal at the age of eighteen.
In addition to that, the change of status will cause another problem that is also
connected with marriage. Let us assume that the two people in the above-mentioned
example marry before they both reach the age of twenty-three. In that case, their
matrimonial property will be governed by German law because "the matrimonial
property right effects of the marriage are governed by the law which is determinant of the
general effects of the marriage at the time the marriage is concluded."220 Since the law
points to the conclusion of the marriage, the matrimonial property regime will be
governed by German law for all time and does not change if the spouses lose their
German nationality at the age of twenty-three.
If one of them dies after that time, the remaining spouse will have to claim his or
her statutory right of succession according to foreign law, because according to
article 25 (1) EGBGB the testamentary "succession is governed by the law of the state of
which the testator was a citizen at the time of his death."222 If the foreign law also uses
citizenship as a connecting factor for the right of succession, matrimonial property rights
and succession rights will be governed by two different legal regimes. With this
combination, the surviving spouse can be in a better position than with the application of
one complete set of rules, may that be either German or foreign law and that causes
additional private international law problems.
220 EGBGB art. 15 (1) (F.R.G.) translated by SIMON L. GOREN, supra note 178, at 438.
221
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22 EGBGB art. 25 (1) (F.R.G.) translated by SIMON L. GOREN, supra note 178, at 441.
223 See Gruber, supra note 3, at 429
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This leads to the conclusion that the person's status can change by virtue of mere
inaction without an active step towards another jurisdiction. In addition to that, there will
be the mentioned complications with respect to matrimonial property regime, so it must
be said that the second sentence of article 5 (1) EGBGB is inadequate for handling the
private international law implications of the new citizenship law.
4. The general criticism of the second sentence of article 5(1) EGBGB
This preliminary result can be supported by a look at the extensive criticism to
which this particular part of article 5 (1) EGBGB has been subjected before and after it
was enacted. A short look at the historical developments in the treatment of people with
a German and a foreign nationality is helpful. The Supreme Court of the German Empire
favored the German nationality in the same way the new article 5(1) EGBGB does.
However, this opinion radically changed, and before the enactment of the new
article 5(1) EGBGB. the whole judicature as well as the bulk of legal scholars were in
favor of applying the concept of "effective nationality" in cases where a person's
multiple nationalities included German. The Federal Court of Justice in civil matters was
the first to recognize that the above-mentioned ideal of achieving unanimous results by
courts in different jurisdictions does not allow German law to apply if the person has
9") ^
significantly closer relations with another (foreign) jurisdiction.
This opinion was further supported in a subsequent decision which pointed out
that a rigid rule preferring one nationality (like the current article 5(1) EGBGB) would
be capable of disturbing the accomplishment of this goal in a very substantial way. 226
224 RGZ 150,374(376,382).
225 BGHZ 75, 32(41).
226 BGHZ 78, 293 (302).
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The Federal Administrative Court explicitly consented to this opinion"' and even the
Federal Constitution Court pointed out in a 1974 opinion that the concept of effective
nationality (or citizenship) would be preferable. It reasoned that "in contrast to
connecting the person with an exclusive (possibly merely formal) citizenship, the
connection with a legal system which is closer to the individual" could be beneficial for
the affected person.
2
Legal scholars already fought against the second sentence of
article 5 (1) EGBGB when it was still a draft. Some indicated that the principle of
"effective citizenship" is in the interest of the affected individual because it respects
one's personal relations with a legal system,"" and some pointed out that "nationality is
but a mere indication or presumption of a close or real connection" with the particular
country." Others simply called the drafted article 5 (1) EGBGB an "incredible
regress." The reform was also contrary to all recommendations and the explicit
opposition of Germany's most famous Private International Law institution 232
21 BVerwGE 68, 220 (224).
^
8 BVerfGE 37. 217(257).
Heinz-Peter Mansel, Verfassungrechtlicher Gleichheitssatz, deutsche Doppelstaater und die Lehre von
der effektiven Staatsangehorigkeit im Internationalen Privatrecht [The constitutional principle of equal
protection, Germans citizens with double nationality and the theory of effective citizenship in Private
International Law], 39 NEUE JURJSTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 625, 631-32 (1986).
Jiirgen Samtleben, Mehrstaater im IPR [Multinational persons in Private International Law], 42
Rabels Zeitschrift Fur AuslAndisches Und Internationales Privatrecht [RabelsZ] 471 (1978).
Christian von Bar, Neue Rechtsprechung zum Kollisionsrecht [Latest jurisdiction about Private
International Law], 39 [JZ] 126 (1984).
" Peter Dopffel et al., Thesen zur Reform des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts [Theses about
the Reform of Private International Law], 44 RABELS ZEITSCHRJFT Fur AUSLANDISCHES UND
Internationales Privatrecht [RabelsZ] 344, 348 (1980) contains the suggestions of the Max-Planck-
Institute for Foreign and Private International Law. The position was repeated by the institute when the
draft of Art. 5(1) S.2 EGBGB was shaped in the form in which it entered into force. See Stellungnahme des
Max-Planck-Instituts fur auslandisches und Internationales Privatrecht zum Regierungsentwurf von 1983
[Comment of the Max-Planck-Institute for Foreign and Private International Law], 47 RabelsZ 595, 610
(1983) [hereinafter Institution comment].
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Even after the reform, the resistance hasn't faded233 and is still upheld today.234 Together
with the above-mentioned difficulties that will arise out of the newly enacted § 29 (3)
StAG and considering the ideal of uniformity as a primary goal of Private International
Law, there are a lot of good arguments against the exceptional provision of
article 5 (1) EGBGB that would support its cancellation or amendment.
5. Additional justification of the second sentence of article 5(1) EGBGB
With this preliminary result in mind, a look at the historic justification of the
provision is indispensable for a definite conclusion. One of the major arguments in favor
of article 5 (1) EGBGB was the practical concern that the principle of effective
nationality makes the determination of the applicable result too difficult.235 This
argument seems to be persuasive at first blush because a lot of factors have to be taken
into account with respect to the determination of the effective citizenship.236 However,
for most German nationals who also possess a foreign nationality, the applicability of
German law could not be questioned. According to the general rule of effective
citizenship laid down in article 5 (1) EGBGB, the usual residence will be a substantial
factor to determine which nationality is effective. It follows that German courts will
only be willing to take jurisdiction over the case if the closest connection points to
~)
'J o
Germany because of the person's usual residence there.
233
Heinz-Peter Mansel, Personalstatut, Staatsangehorigkeit Und Effektivitat [Personal
Status, Citizenship And Effectivity] 202 (1988).
234 Gerhard Kegel, Internationales Privatrecht [Private International Law] 332 (7th ed. 1995).
Rupert Scholz & Rainer Pitschas, Effektive Staatsangehorigkeit und Grundgesetz [Effective Nationality
and the Constitution], 37 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2721, 2727 (1984).
236
See Mansel, supra note 233, at 265.
237 EGBGB art. 5(1) (F.R.G.).
Institution comment, supra note 232, at 610.
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The contrary view neglects the fact that the principle of effective citizenship only
points to a foreign legal system if the person has a substantially closer connection to that
jurisdiction which will only be present in exceptional cases. Therefore, the rule set
forth in the second sentence of article 5 ( 1 ) EGBGB cannot be justified for practical
240
reasons.
In addition to that, this aspect compromises the first advantage of article 5 (1)
EGBGB stated above: the application of German lex fori. In the light of the practical
circumstances, this desirable result could be reached if the second sentence of
article 5(1) EGBGB would be deleted and the theory of effective citizenship applied in
all cases. It has been said that this would give the additional advantage of reaching a
certain degree of uniformity in decisions with the Anglo-American jurisdictions. 41
Another justification of preferring the German nationality was a constitutionality
concern. It has been said, for instance, that the theory of effective citizenship would deny
a German who also has a foreign nationality the ability to choose in favor of the German
nationality if that is not the effective one."
4
However, the effective nationality is
influenced by subjective factors to a big extent. According to the current concept of
effective nationality, the intent of the person is already a key factor. 243 Although grounds
for constitutional objection were found, the dispute has been settled in a way to be sure
that the principle of effective citizenship is constitutional. 44
239
See MANSEL, supra note 233, at 205.
See Institution commenf, supra note 232, at 610.
MANSEL, supra note 233, at 207. The matter of reaching uniformity with the common law jurisdictions
will be discussed in Part IV, infra.
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Scholz & Pitschas, supra note 235, at 2726.
MANSEL, supra note 233, at 265.
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See the extensive discussion in Mansel, supra note 233, at 626-632.
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6. Result regarding the second sentence of article 5(1) EGBGB
In the light of all these arguments, it seems clear that in its current form,
article 5(1) EGBGB will not be able to meet the challenges of the future when it comes
to a person's status determination of German Private International Law. Since the new-
citizenship law is very likely to increase the number of inhabitants with double
nationality and one of those nationalities will almost always be German, the exceptional
second sentence of article 5(1) EGBGB will have a far broader scope in the future.
Since the provision was a deplorable regress in the development of German
Private International Law,
245
the course should be reversed by either the deletion of or the
further amendment of the second sentence of article 5(1) EGBGB.
C. Conclusion
Of course, the latter result raises the question of how an amendment or change
should be shaped. For this consideration, a look at the common law principle of
domicile, which is the most widespread alternative to nationality as a connecting factor,
seems appropriate. It has already been said that the principle of effective citizenship will
be able to form a compromise between the common law and civil law jurisdictions,
although the latter would naturally have to get rid of their provisions similar to the second
sentence of article 5(1) EGBGB first.
To obtain a change that will be able to handle the expected increase of people
with more than one nationality, while keeping the primary goal of reaching decision
245
See KEGEL, supra note 234, at 332.
246
See Gruber, supra note 3, at 427.
247
MANSEL, supra note 233, at 207.
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uniformity in mind, it is therefore now time for a comparative view in order to see if the
Anglo-American concept of domicile in whole or in part can contribute to the solution.
Chapter IV -
The Common Law Concept of Domicile
In common law jurisdictions throughout the world, the concept of domicile is
used to determine the personal law that governs a person's status with respect to
marriage, its effects on the property rights of husband and wife, jurisdiction in divorce
and nullity of marriage, legitimacy, legitimization and adoption, as well as the right of
succession.' With the significant exception of jurisdiction that is not based upon
nationality in Germany, the scope of nationality and domicile is virtually identical."
However, when it comes to a definition of domicile difficulties arise since this concept is
far from being uniform throughout the world. 25 Additionally, the concept of domicile
has changed considerably in the last three decades throughout a number of common law
jurisdictions. Therefore, a thorough insight into the various concepts followed by an
overall evaluation will be necessary.
A. The English concept
The common law first developed in Great Britain and the colonies that became
independent common law jurisdictions later on in history originally received the concept
of domicile while under British rule. 25
248
See NORTH & Fawcett, supra note 6, at 1 39.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
50
Cf. North & Fawcett, supra note 6, at 1 39.
251
Peter Stone, The Conflict Of Laws 12 (1995).
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Therefore, it is appropriate to start the analysis from the English viewpoint. Already in
the nineteenth century, it was said that a person's status "is governed universally by one
single principle, namely, that of domicil. which is the criterion established by law for the
purpose of determining civil status." The object of determining a person's domicile is
T C "3
to connect him with some system or rule of law.*" As Lord Westbury declared in 1 868,
domicile "is the relation which the law creates between an individual and a particular
locality or country".
254
According to this viewpoint, a "person is, in general, domiciled in
the country in which he is considered by English law to have his permanent home."*
1 . The exclusiveness and definiteness of domicile
It is important to note two major principles that distinguish the concept of
domicile from the concept of nationality. First, according to the English Private
International Law. no person can be without a domicile.25 The rule is "based on the
practical necessity of connecting every person with some system of law by which a
number of his legal relationships may be regulated." This notable fact eliminates the
problems that arise in jurisdictions which use nationality as the principal connecting
factor. A person can be stateless yet still has to be connected somehow with a certain
territory or jurisdiction for purposes of determining his personal status.
252 Udny v. Udny, L. R. Sc. &Div. 441, 457 (1869).
253 Dicey & Morris, supra note 6, at 118.
254
Bell v. Kennedy, L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 307, 320 (1868).
255
Dicey & Morris, supra note 6, at 1 16 [Rule 4(1)].
"6
Bell v. Kennedy, L. R. 1 Sc. & Div. at 320; Udny v. Udny, L. R. 1 Sc. & Div. at 448, 453, 457.
257 Dicey & Morris, supra note 6, at 120.
* In Germany, this problem is dealt with in EGBGB art. 5 (2) (F.R.G.).
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Another principle of the English concept is that "no person can at the same time
for the same purpose have more than one domicile."^
9
Since the objective is to connect a
person "with some system or rule of law, it is obvious that, for the purpose of any given
inquiry, a person cannot have more than one domicile, and the Rule to this effect is now
well established."
2
' ' In the words of the most frequently cited decision of Udny v. Udny,
it is "clear that by our law a man must have some domicil, and must have a single
9A 1
domicil." Despite suggestions for a change in that position, the rule is still valid today
in the English law of domicile.
2. The domicile of origin and domicile of choice
Another significant feature of the English concept of domicile is the
differentiation between a person's domicile of origin and his or her domicile of choice.
At birth, a person acquires a domicile of origin which is identical to the domicile
possessed by one of his parents at the date of birth. 263 If the person is a marital child at
his birth and his father is alive, the relevant parent is the father. 64 If the person is a non-
marital child, the relevant person is the mother.
265 One significant characteristic of this
particular domicile is the fact that a person's "domicile of origin is fixed at his birth, and
cannot be changed by anything which happens subsequently."266
259 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 6, at 120 [Rule 6]; see also Udny v. Udny, L. R. 1 Sc. & Div. at 448;
Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Bullock, 1 W.L.R. 1 178 1 184 (1976); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 3 W.L.R.
125, 1 38 (1985); NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 6, at 140.
260
Dicey & Morris, supra note 6, at 12 1
.
261 Udny v. Udny, L. R. 1 Sc. & Div. at 448.
262
Cf. STONE, supra note 25 1 , at 14.
263
Id. at 15.
264 Udny v. Udny, L. R. 1 Sc. & Div. at 457; DlCEY & MORRIS, supra note 6, at 125 [Rule 9 (1) (a)].
265 STONE, supra note 251,at 15; Udny v. Udny, L. R. 1 Sc. & Div. at 457; DlCEY & MORRIS, supra note 6,
at 126[Rule9(l)(b)].
266
STONE, supra note 25 1 , at 1 5.
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For that reason, there "is the strongest possible presumption in favour of the continuance
of a domicil of origin."
267
In contrast, the domicile of choice can be acquired and can
displace the domicile of origin. "Every independent person can acquire a domicile of
choice by the combination of residence and intention of permanent or indefinite
residence, but not otherwise." For the delineating both aspects. Lord Macnaghten
made the most illustrative statement at the beginning of the 20th century, saying that
"domicil of origin, or as it is sometimes called, perhaps less accurately, domicil of birth,
differs from domicil of choice mainly in this - that its character is more enduring, its hold
stronger and it is less easily shaken off."
The general rule requires two preconditions for the acquisition of a domicile of
choice, namely residence and intention to reside that are normally referred to as the
970
factum and animus. The first element, that of residence, means little more than
physical presence although "a person is not resident in a country in which he is present
97 I
casually or as a traveler." As a more recent decision by the English Chancery Division
has stated, residence "in a country for the purposes of the law of domicile is physical
97?
presence in that country as an inhabitant of it." The length of the residence is not
materially relevant under the English concept. Although a long period of residence can
97 1
be used as evidence for proving the intention to reside'
, it is not a requirement which
would alone amount to the acquisition of a domicile of choice. Neither is it necessary for
267 North & Fawcett, supra note 6, at 155.
268 Dicey & Morris, supra note 6, at 128 [Rule 10].
269 Winans v. Attorney General, 73 L.J.K.B. 613, 616 (1904).
270
A. W. Scorr, Private International Law (Conflict of Laws) 24 (1978); J.G. Collier, Conflict
Of Laws 43 (2d. ed. 1994).
271
Cf. Manning v. Manning, L.R. 2 P. & D. 223, 226 (1871).
272
l.R.C. v. Duchess of Portland, 2 W.L.R. 367, 371 (1982).
273
See Dicey & Morris, supra note 6, at 129.
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the duration of residence to be long in point of time.
274
In fact, residence for only a few
days or even part of a day has been held to be sufficient. " Therefore, an immigrant can
acquire a domicile immediately upon his arrivals
The far more difficult prerequisite for the acquisition of domicile under the
English concept is the intention of permanent residence. This requires an intention to
reside permanently or for an unlimited amount of time, or in the words of Lord
Westerbury, "it must be a residence fixed not for a limited period or a particular purpose,
but general and indefinite in its future contemplation." The crucial point about the
establishment of this requirement is the necessity to prove the intent in a court
proceeding. There, the "burden of proving the requisite intention lies on the party
978
alleging such acquisition." This burden of proof is quite high, as is explained partly by
the wide-ranging character of the evidence that might be invoked and partly "because the
domicile of origin has a peculiarly adhesive quality, so that it is particularly difficult to
establish a domicile of choice where the existing domicil, to be displaced, is the domicile
of origin." Especially when the alleged change is between a domicile of origin and a
domicile of choice, it has been held that the standard of proof required by the court is one
of "perfect clearness and satisfaction", thus amounting to a far higher standard than the
well known American "preponderance of the evidence" standard generally required in
274
Bell v. Kennedy, L. R. 1 Sc. & Div. 307, 319; Stone v. Stone 1 W.L.R. 1287 (1958).
275
Fasbender v. Attorney General, 2 Ch. 850, 857-58 (1922).
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Bell v. Kennedy, L. R. 1 Sc. & Div. at 319; DlCEY & MORRIS, supra note 6, at 129; STONE, supra note
251, at 15; NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 6, at 143.
277 Udny v. Udny, L. R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441, 458 (1869).
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STONE, supra note 25 1 , at 1 8.
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Bell v. Kennedy, 1 L. R 1 Sc. & Div. 317, 321 (1868).
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civil matters/ 81 Although more recent decisions favor the regular standard of proof/ it
will still be difficult to prove something that the person possibly never thought about.
Consequently, it has been said that "the evidence adduced in a disputed case of domicil is
often both voluminous and difficult to assess and this is due to the over-scrupulous
manner in which the courts attempt to discover a man's exact intention." This "over-
scrupulous manner" is obviously a point of consideration that makes the lives of
practitioners, courts and clients extremely difficult.
For practical purposes, the most important factor about the skepticism with
respect to sufficient proof of intent of permanent residence is the refusal to recognize any
presumption of intent after a certain period of residence has passed. In the words of Lord
Macmillan, "residence alone is not enough. The law requires volition to change.
Prolonged actual residence is an important item of evidence of such volition, but it must
be supplemented by other facts and circumstances indicative of intention." The
logical consequence of the difficulty of establishing an intention is found in the court's
extreme reluctance to assume the acquisition of a new domicile even after the person
spent several years or even decades in the new place of residence. For instance, a period
of 32 years was deemed as insufficient in 1869" as a period of 40 years was in a 1976
-> on
decision.
281
See 168 The Law Commission and The Scottish Law Commission 6 (1987) [hereinafter Law.
Com.].
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See Buswell v. I.R.C., 1 W.L.R. 1631, 1637 (1974) rejecting the idea of a "standard of proof
intermediate between the criminal and civil standard as well as Lawrence v. Lawrence, 3 W.L.R. 125, 131
(1985).
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3. Evaluation of the concept
For the purposes of our comparative view, there are outstanding difficulties with
the English concept of the law of domicile which render any transformation of its
elements into German Private International Law and especially into article 5(1) EGBGB
impossible. First, there is the matter of dividing the law of domicile into domicile of
choice and domicile of origin which results in the above mentioned practical difficulties.
This division was already criticized by the report of the Law Commission presented to
the Parliament in 1987 which declared that the division "creates unnecessary complexity
and results in the drawing of unhelpful legal distinctions". It was criticized that the
"retention of the concept of the domicile of origin has led to the doctrine of the revival of
that domicile, with the result that a person may be domiciled in a country which he has
never visited."
J
The latter result cannot especially be brought in accordance with the above-
mentioned general goal of Private International Law, which is to identify the person with
the territory he is most closely connected with." The idea ofjudging a person according
to the rules of a jurisdiction in which he or she has never set foot seems to be particularly
unappealing in light of this ideal. In fact, the Law Commission rightfully pointed out in
an earlier working paper that this undesirable result must be viewed as one of the major
downsides of the concept of nationality. Because of their rigidity, the rules regarding
domicile of origin have thus even been referred to as amounting to "nationality in
288 Law. Com., supra note 28 1 , at 8.
289
Id.
290
See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
291
See 88 The Law Commission Working Paper, Private International Law - The Law of
Domicile 14 (1985) (hereinafter Law Commission working paper).
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disguise"
292
and "artificial, in that they lead to an established domicile being retained
long after any real connection with the country in question has ended"." In conclusion,
all these factors plainly speak against any transfer of this particular concept. Because of
these difficulties , the Law Commission stated that they "can see no case for the retention
of the domicile of origin and we recommend that, as a separate type of domicile
determined according to a separate set of rules, it should disappear from the laws of the
United Kingdom."294
These solutions were broadly accepted among legal scholars as a "simplification
and improvement"" ' and as an "important step in the process of improving the
effectiveness and fairness of the English rules of domicile". However, the Law
Commission's ideas were apparently not taken into account by the English legislature, or
at least not to a degree that would have led to the abolishment of the domicile of origin
concept. Indeed, until "such time as these recommendations are acted upon, the domicile
907
of origin remains of great importance". More recently, it was stated that the
"government accepted the proposal in 1991 and it is hoped that legislation will soon be
introduced."
298
With respect to a possible reform of article 5(1) EGBGB, it seems unadvisable to
transfer into German law a concept, whose abolishment was rightfully recommended by
the Law Commission of its home jurisdiction.
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See Stone, supra note 251, at 12.
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294 Law. Com., supra note 281, at 19.
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Trevor C. Hartley et al. eds., 1993).
298 Mayss, supra note 296, at 183.
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Additionally, even the English rules for acquiring a domicile of choice are of no
use for a transfer into an amended article 5(1) EGBGB because of their above-mentioned
uncertainty with respect to the establishment of proof. In particular, there is a great deal
of legal uncertainty introduced by the reluctance to recognize a rebuttable presumption in
favor of assuming intent to reside after a certain period of time has passed.
The Law Commission has also addressed this concern when it stated that the
"rules for determining whether a domicile of choice has been acquired are criticized as
both artificial and uncertain."29 The commission itself has recognized at some point that
the introduction of a presumption would prove useful and recommended that "a
rebuttable presumption of an intention to make home indefinitely in a country based on
seven years of habitual residence as an adult should be introduced". 30 This
recommendation would have made the determination of intent much easier and
practicable. The Law Commission stated with respect to the presumption:
Its great merit is that it might be thought to provide an effective and helpful way
for courts, lawyers, administrators and individuals to determine a person's
domicile without the need, in every case, to undertake a detailed examination of a
person's past life in order to discover his intention at the relevant time. In many
cases, it was thought, such an investigation would lead to the conclusion that he
intended to live indefinitely in the country in which he had been habitually
resident for the last seven years. Any danger of an inappropriate conclusion being
reached might adequately be met by making clear that the presumption as to
intention was rebuttable.
301
Even before that, the presumption had already taken a more concrete shape. In an
earlier working paper a period of seven years of habitual residence was deemed to be
sufficient to give rise to a presumption about the person's intent. It was stated that
'9 Law Com., supra note 281, at 8.
300 LAW COM., supra note 28 1 , at 27.
301
Id
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though we accept that there is no magic in seven years, it seems to us to strike
about the right balance between the interests of the expatriate in not being put
unnecessarily to proof in order to rebut the presumption and retain his domicile,
and of the courts, legal advisers and administrative officials in not being put to
lengthy investigations of a person's subjective state of mind in cases where the
objective facts point to a change of domicile.
However, the Law Commission ultimately reversed course and backed away from
the recommendation of a presumption. They pointed out that any presumption must
operate fairly and were concerned that people willing to rebut the presumption would be
"put to trouble and expense in doing so". Furthermore, the commission stressed the
argument that "there is a particular difficulty in rebutting the presumption if the person
whose domicile is in issue is dead." ' At first blush, these arguments seem to be
convincing but they lose a lot of their force if one bears in mind some of the above-
mentioned difficulties with the existing system and the required proof of intent.
First, concededly a presumption would put those who wish to rebut the
presumption to expense and trouble. But on the other hand, one cannot deny that a
presumption would put those who wish to utilize the results of the presumption out of the
above-mentioned expense and trouble in establishing their intent for the acquisition of a
domicile of choice. In other words, a workable presumption would at least save the
expense and trouble in establishing intention for a great number of cases.
With respect to the second argument, it has to be noted that the difficulty in
rebutting the presumption in the case of a deceased person is already a problem under the
current requirements of establishing intention.
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In such a situation, the establishment of intention can be as difficult as in a
possible rebuttal of the presumption that the Law Commission originally had in mind.
Regarding this counterargument it has been well said that
4i
it was found in practice under
the old order that it was notoriously difficult to establish the acquisition of a domicile of
choice by a propositus who was now dead."
In other words, the established concept has no significant advantage over the
suggested presumption and should have been replaced as the Law Commission originally
recommended. This result is supported by the convincing arguments that were presented
in the working paper and in the report itself before the course was reversed.
In the light of all these considerations, the English concept cannot help very much
in solving the problem with the German Private International Law article 5(1) EGBGB.
In other words, this consideration qualifies the English concept of the law of domicile as
a patient rather than a doctor.
B. The American approach
The United States is another major common law jurisdiction that uses the concept
of domicile as a connecting factor for personal status, e.g. marital relationship, parent and
child relationship and the distribution of personal property at death. 306
1 . The basic elements of the term "domicile"
The use of domicile instead of the civil law concept of nationality can be mainly
explained by the fact that the United States operates under a federal system.
305
Ellison Kahn, Conflict of Laws -Legislation-, Annual Survey of South African Law 673,
675(1992).
306
See Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws 163 (2d. ed. 1992).
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Therefore it "seems highly unlikely that personal law questions, such as those in
which domicile is utilized, could be effectively resolved on the basis of national
citizenship."
30
This is especially true in the United States, where "most personal law
topics such as marriage, divorce, child custody and succession of property are state law-
matters because they are among those subjects reserved to the states of the United States
for determination. " Thus, the use of a link with a certain territory is more suited for
connecting a person with a certain set of rules than the use of nationality.
2. The lack of uniformity in the domicile concept
A uniform definition of the term domicile cannot be easily found in the United
States. The Second Restatement defines domicile as "a place, usually a person's home,
to which the rules of Conflict of Laws sometimes accord determinative significance
because of the person's identification with that place."3 A significant description has
been given in a famous court decision in which Justice Holmes held that
what the law means by domicile is the one technically preeminent headquarters,
which as a result either of fact or fiction every person is compelled to have in
order that by aid of it, certain rights and duties which have attached to it by the
law may be determined. 310
The Second Restatement further states that home "is the place where a person
dwells and which is the center of his domestic, social and civil life."311 But the problem
only shifts from one problematic definition to another. Where is this center of domestic,
social and civil life to be found ?
307
Id. at 172; see also Graveson, Conflict of Laws- Private International Law 185 (7th ed. 1974).
308 SCOLES & Hay, supra note 306, at 172.
309 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 11 ( 1 ) ( 1 97 1 ).
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Bergner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, 51 N.E. 531, 532 (1898).
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' Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 1 2 ( 1 97 1 ).
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In order to determine the content of domicile, it is also important to note that
"within the United States, courts utilizing the concept of domicile for different purposes
and as to different issues may emphasize different elements to such an extent as to raise
the question whether there are not several kinds of domicile."" In the words of the
Restatement* s comment, the
core of the domicile concept remains constant in all situations. With rare
exceptions, the courts assume that the rules of domicil are the same for all
purposes, and it is customary for them to cite indiscriminately in their opinions
cases dealing with domicil for purposes other than the one immediately
involved.
313
However, the concept of domicile is used in a wide variety of contexts and is
extremely dependent upon inferences drawn from the facts, so that "courts can shift its
meaning subtly by shifting the emphasis on one or another element of the definition or by
drawing different reasonable inferences from essentially the same fact pattern."314 For
example, an American court might be reluctant to find that an American has abandoned
his domicile here and has become domiciled abroad whereas he is willingly permitted to
reacquire a domicile in the United States. This result is achieved by simply requiring
more evidence for establishing a shift of domicile to the new country. This, in turn,
requires less evidence to show a reacquisition of domicile back in the United States.315
The drafters of the Restatement have acknowledged this fact, as the official comment
indicates:
312 SCOLES & HAY. supra note 306, at 180.
313 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 11 (2)cmt. o(1988 Revisions)
Russell E. Weintraub, An Inquiry into the Utility of "Domicile" as a Concept in Conflicts Analysis, 63
MICH. L. Rev. 961, 984 (1965).
315
See Willis L. M. Reese, Does Domicil bear a single Meaning ?, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 589, 596 (1955).
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Domicile serves a large number of purposes, and undoubtedly somewhat different
reasons and motivations underlie its use for certain purposes. It may therefore be
expected that the courts will on occasion be either more or less inclined to find a person
domiciled in a state for one purpose (as to give him a divorce) than for another purpose
(as to subject him to be substituted service or to certain forms of taxation). The extent to
which actual court decisions are affected by this consideration is obscured by two factors:
(1) even within a single state the courts do not always use identical language in stating
the rules of domicil, particularly those relating to the required attitude of mind toward the
place in question and (2) the rules, however phrased, are extremely general and flexible
in operation. Domicil for diversity of citizenship purposes is governed by federal law
and may differ from domicil in the local law of a state."316
This result can be considered to be a general problem and is not particularly
inherent to the concept of domicile. Courts have a general tendency to attain "what they
deem to be the right result in the individual case. And it would be indeed surprising if
they did not take advantage of the flexibility in application of the rules of domicile to
achieve this end."
317
Thus, one cannot say that the concept of domicile is too confusing
altogether and should be abandoned and replaced by a direct consideration of the policies
that underlie the decisions in different areas of conflict analysis. The variations that
can be observed are more a general phenomenon of United States court policy and
manipulation of legal doctrine than a key defect of the law of domicile.
316 Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws § 11 (2) cmt. o (1988 Revisions); see also Stifel v.
Hopkins. 477 F.2d 1 1 16 (1 124 (6th Cir. 1973).
1 See Reese, supra note 3 1 5, at 596-97.
318
Weintraub expresses this position in supra note 3 14, at 985-86.
71
According to the Second Restatements official comment, "the core of domicile is
everywhere the same. But in close cases, decision of a question of domicil may
sometimes depend upon the purpose for which the domicil concept is used in the
particular case."
319
It can be concluded that by and large, the rules of domicile do not
vary greatly in different situations.
3. The attribution of one single domicile for every person
One thing that the American concept has in common with the English approach is
that every "person has a domicile at all times and, at least for the same purpose, no
person has more than one domicile at a time." In the words of the Restatement, a
single domicile is needed "since the law of a person's domicil determines many of his
important interests". Furthermore, a person must have only one domicile since "if a
person might have domicils in two or more states at the same time and for the same
purpose, the concept of domicil could not be used to select the state whose law governs
171
certain of the person's important legal interests."
With this construction of the concept of domicile, the American Law Institute
obviously avoided to run into the same problem that was described above with respect to
the concept of nationality, namely the problem of double citizenship or nationality. By
preventing a person to be domiciled in more than one state through the operation of law,
the clarity and definiteness of the connecting factor could be achieved. Consequently, a
concept comparable to the effective nationality approach mentioned above did not have
319 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § ll(2)cmt. o(1988 Revisions).
320
Reese, supra note 3 15, at 597.
321 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 1 1 (2) (1988 Revision).
322
Id. at cmt. m (1988 Revision).
323
Id
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to be developed. In other words, there is no such thing as '"effective domicile" in the
event of a person having a dwelling in two or more territorial units. However, the factual
problem in such situations remains essentially the same and calls for the selection of
something like an '"effective'* domicile.
In another section, the Restatement (Second) deals with this problem. According
to § 20, ""when a person with capacity to acquire a domicil of choice has more than one
dwelling place, his domicil is in the earlier dwelling place unless the second dwelling
place is his principal home. ,,j24 In trying to resolve and illustrate the conflict between
two dwellings, the comment of the Restatement states that one dwelling "may be a home
in the sense used in this Restatement (see § 12), and the other merely a residence. This is
the most common situation of all'*. This assumption deals with the situation in which a
person lives in one dwelling and uses the other one for weekend or vacation purposes . 326
If, however, both dwellings are a "home" within the meaning of § 12 of the Restatement,
then the crucial question arises where the person has his or her "principal" home:
As between two homes, a person's principal home is that to which he is more
closely related or, stated in other words, that which is more nearly the center of
his domestic, civil and social life. This will normally be the home where he and
his family spend the greater part of their time. 327
""Oft
Additionally, the principal home can be determined by a multitude of factors,
such as the location of the bulk of the household furniture, where the person is more
engaged in social activities such as voting, attending church or belonging to local clubs
324 Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws § 20 (1988 Revisions).
325
Id. §20cmt.b(l).
326
See id.
327
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61 Harv. L. Rev. 1232, 1235-37 (1948).
and -most importantly- the person's own feelings.
32
Especially the latter factor is
considered to be "of great importance. His statements in this connection cannot be
deemed conclusive, however, since they may have been made to attain some ulterior
objective and may not represent his real state of mind."330 However, the Restatement*
s
comment points out in another section that "the person's desires as to the location of his
domicil may be permitted to tip the scales in favor of one state or the other."" The
courts also have broadly adopted the importance of a person's expressed intent in the
determination of domicile in the case of two homes.
In conclusion the American concept of domicile eventually faces the same
problem that was described above in the discussion of double nationality: in both cases
there are two points to which the band of the connecting factor can be attached
(nationality or residence). However, in case of a division of factors, the American system
recruits the person's intention as the crucial factor for determining the "effective" or
"principal" home and thus the person's domicile instead of relying on a rigid rule of
preferring one place of connection in all cases, like article 5 (1) EGBGB does.
4. The domicile of origin
Although substantially different from the English approach, the American concept
of domicile still maintains the differentiation between domicile of origin and domicile of
choice. According to § 14 of the Restatement (Second), the "domicil of origin is the
329
Id.
330
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331 Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws § 18 cmt. g (1988 Revisions).
32 Chambers v. Hathaway, 187 Cal. 104, 106 (Cal. 1921); Hurst v. City of Flemingsburg, 188 S.W. 1085,
1086 (Ky. 1916); In re Paullin's Will, 92 N.J.Eq. 419, 422 (N.J. 1921); In re Newcomb's Estate, 84 N.E.
950, 955 (N.Y. 1908); In re Windsor's Estate, 264 Pa. 552, 555 (Pa. 1919).
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domicil which a person has at birth."333 The American concept introduces the same
distinction as the English concept, namely that the parent who determines the domicile of
origin of the child by is the father in case of a marital child and the mother in case of an
nonmarital child/34 Initially, the concept of domicile of origin serves the same purpose
as under the English concept, namely the early connection of dependent persons with a
certain territory or area of law. "Since this domicile is the first assigned, it will continue
until a new domicile is acquired."" However, in the United States, the domicile of
origin serves "only the function of initiating the succession of domiciles that one may
acquire during lifetime."336 This has been explained by the fact that
The United States has been a country of immigrants in which the concept of the
domicile of choice was utilized to absorb rapidly many people born in other lands
into a highly mobile population, many of whom frequently moved from state to
state in the federal system. As a consequence, the English doctrine never gained a
substantial foothold in the United States. 337
Additionally, American courts rejected the above-mentioned revival of the
J T O
domicile of origin. After a consistent line of decisions, this was also formulated in the
Restatement (Second). Its official comment states that if "a domicil of choice is
abandoned without acquiring a new domicil of choice, the domicil of origin is not thereby
revived, but the last domicil of choice continues to be the domicil."339
33 Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws § 14 ( 1 ) ( 1 988 Revisions).
334 M§14(2).
15
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Thus, the domicile of origin does not have any particular meaning with respect to
its adhesion, abandonment or revival. It merely establishes the initial domicile for
dependent persons as a starting point from which the individual is free to establish new
subsequent domiciles of choice without being connected to the original domicile ever
again in his life.
5. Requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice
One of the major fields of domicile litigation is in the acquisition of a domicile of
choice.
340 The problems mainly circle around the two requisite factors: physical presence
and intention towards the place of the alleged domicile. The Restatement (Second) says
that a "domicil of choice may be acquired by a person who is legally capable of changing
his domicil."
341
In addition to legal capacity, acquisition of a domicil of choice also
in
requires a "physical presence" and "an attitude of mind". In the words of the Georgia
Code, the domicile of a person may be changed "by an actual change of residence with
the avowed intention of remaining at the new residence."343
The domicile will be established only if these two factors coincide at a certain
moment in time. According to Restatement (Second), the "fact of physical presence at the
particular place must concur with the existence of the required attitude of mind. If there is
such concurrence, and the requisite legal capacity, a change of domicil takes place." 344
340
See SCOLES & Hay, supra note 306, at 1 8 1
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Both federal as well as state courts also recognize the dual requirements of
intention and physical presence.
345 With respect to the length of the required physical
presence, there is no specific time that must elapse before the presence is considered to be
sufficient.
346 The Restatement (Second) sheds little light on this matter since it states that
there "is some uncertainty as to how long one must be physically present in a place in
order to satisfy the requirement of presence for the acquisition of a domicile of
choice."
347 Some courts have expressed that there "is no minimum period of residency
required." or that the "length of the residence is immaterial provided the other elements
are present and are found to exist". In other cases, where an individual living in one
state resigned employment in that state, accepted a position contemplating continuous
employment in another state, sold the house and moved his family to the new location,
intending and anticipating to stay there, one could assume that the new domicile is
acquired immediately upon arrival. 35 ' However, the official comment of the Restatement
(Second) cautions the courts that such "statements are not to be taken literally. At least
for most purposes, a person will not have a sufficient relationship to a place to warrant
holding that place to be the domicil unless the person has been present there for a time at
least."
351
Physical presence is therefore not generally considered too high a hurdle to clear
even though the very lenient approach by some courts does not find universal favor.
345
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The second precondition - the presence of intent - is of greater importance
5
~ and
far more difficult.
353 The Restatement (Second) states in § 18 that to "acquire a domicil
of choice in a place, a person must intend to make that place his home for the time at
least."
354
The intention must be a presently-held intention, but the duration of the period
necessary has been a major concern about this requirement as well. In earlier
decisions, it was held perhaps influenced by the similar English concept discussed above
that the intention must be to remain permanently. 35 ' However, the development has been
moving away from this original rule:
Because the concept of home and the attitude of mind regarding it involves an
element of persistence and continuity, there is some difference of view in the
cases in which the intention is to make a home at a place for a fixed period of
time, as for example, during a fixed term of employment, public service, or
education.
357
Consequently, more recent cases have concluded that it is sufficient if there is an
intention to make a certain place one's home for the time spent there, even if the duration
of the stay will be eventually limited. The Restatement (Second) declares that if "there
is an intention to make a home at present, the intention is sufficient although the person
whose domicil is in question intends to change his home upon the happening of some
future event."" This is a clear difference compared to the English rule, which requires
352
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the intention to be permanent and independent from a future event. However, the
American approach appears to make more sense with regard to modern living situations
in a world that requires high mobility. This can be well illustrated by the following:
Modern lifestyles demand accommodation of the situation in which a person
knows that he will be changing his home at some time in the future. An
individual can regard a place as his settled abode and have all of the normal
attitudes of mind toward that place as home even though he may anticipate a
future change of home. If such an individual were not permitted to obtain a
domicile, many persons would be deprived of civil rights or benefits dependent on
domicile and would be disenfranchised to the detriment both of themselves and of
the community in which they lived. 361
With respect to certain groups in society (such as teachers, students and project
employees for instance) it is sometimes impossible to establish a lifelong home and it
must be sufficient that the intent to make a home can be present in a shorter period of
time. ' According to the Restatement (Second), it is even possible "for a person to have
the proper attitude of mind even though he does intend to move at a definite time;
although the more distant that time is, the easier it is to find the requirement satisfied."363
In conclusion, with respect to the elements of the acquisition of a domicile of
choice, the American approach is much more flexible and it is easier for the person
alleging the acquisition to reach his or her goal. Especially notable is the fact that in the
American concept, there is nothing comparable to the almost impossible burden of proof
for displacing a domicile of origin in the English concept.
364
In fact, the special note on
evidence for establishment of a domicile of choice in the Restatement (Second) states that
360
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the "rules for the acquisition of a domicil of choice are relatively simple".
365
Thus, it will
be not too difficult to overcome the burden of proof and establish the acquisition of a
domicile of choice in the American system.
6. The special problem of evidence in cases of equal division of contacts
However, there is a problem with the establishment of domicile in the situation
where the person's contacts are more or less equally divided between two or more
jurisdictions. In this situation, the Restatement (Second) says that there are "various
types of evidence that are frequently relied upon in such cases" to solve the difficulty
these cases pose for the courts. It is important to note that according to § 19 of the
Second Restatement a "domicil once established continues until it is superseded by a new
domicil"" and the "burden of proof is on the party who asserts that a change of domicil
has taken place."" The special note on evidence for establishment of a domicile states
further that
this principle is heavily relied upon by the courts. The amount of evidence
necessary to satisfy this burden depends upon the facts of the particular case.
Less is required, for example, when the person has been absent from his domicil
for a considerable period of time. 369
As a general rule, a person's own declarations are admissible as evidence to show
which place is considered to be the person's home; however "their accuracy may be
suspect because of their self-serving nature, particularly when they are made to achieve
some legal objective". 37 ' Consequently, the declaration must "appear to have been made
b5 Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws § 20 ( 1 97 1 ) (special note after § 20).
366
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under circumstances of naturalness and without apparent motive to deceive.
"
J The
restriction to apparent motive to deceive indicates that American courts are not fraught
with the same skepticism that the English courts show towards establishing intent.
However, a self-serving declaration of intent by the person alleging the acquisition of a
new domicile of choice will not be deemed conclusive, but is only a factor in establishing
overall intent, which is inferred from his acts and general conduct. " Therefore, a critical
portion of the evidence is allocated to acts which "speak louder than words" according to
the Restatement (Second). 37 In the words of the Illinois Supreme Court, on "the
question of domicile less weight will be given to the party's declaration than to its
acts."
374
Thus, residing "for a considerable time in a place is persuasive evidence of
domicil there, although this can be rebutted by proof that this residence was meant to be
temporary or that the person has a principal home elsewhere."" It is interesting to note
that the Restatement (Second) speaks of "rebutting" this kind of evidence which makes it
sound almost as if a lengthy period of time establishes some sort of a rebuttable
presumption for the intent to stay in one place and make it the person's home. However,
no authority has ever used this idea or crossed the line towards establishing a concise
presumption in that regard.
371
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Although it has already been pointed out that courts have established certain
presumptions for ascertaining intent,
376
these presumptions were not tied to a certain
amount of time. It was merely implied that the intention might be connected with the
actual fact of his place of residence as a part of the intent "as disclosed by his entire
course of conduct."
377
In Georgia, there is even a statutory presumption that is related to physical
presence but it relies on the person's family rather than on the person whose domicile is
to be determined. According to the Georgia code section 19-2-1 (a), the "domicile of
every person who is of full age and is laboring under no disability is the place where the
3-70
family of the person permanently resides." Thus, the statute is going in the indicated
direction (e.g. inferring intent from the mere presence in a special locality) but with a
different target.
Apart from that, the multitude of factors from which the intention to acquire a
domicile of choice can be inferred control the decision even though the consideration
of how much time was spent residing in the new place might be a controlling factor. 380 In
other words, the amount of time spent in the respective location is only the starting point
of scrutinizing whether the requisite intent was present or not. However, it is not
conclusive and a presumption that would automatically infer the presence of intent after a
certain period of time does not exist.
376
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377
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378 Ga. Code Ann. § 19-2-1 (a) (1999).
'9
See Note, Evidentiary Factors in the Determination of Domic il, 61 HARV. L. Rev. 1232, 1235-37
(1948).
380
Cf. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 426 (1939).
82
7. Evaluation of the concept and conclusion
The American approach clearly has significant advantages in comparison with the
English approach. The distinction between domicile of choice and domicile of origin is
not as rigid and the latter can be easily displaced. This eases the almost impossible
burden of proof placed upon the party alleging the domicile under the English concept
and meets the purpose of increasing mobility all over the world. With respect to
definiteness. the concept seems to have a significant advantage at first blush since a
person can only have one domicile.
However, since residence is the most important objective factor in determining
domicile, the concept can eventually run into the same problems that the German
approach faces, namely the determination of an "effective domicile'*. Even though courts
or legal scholars do not use that particular term, the decision between two residences
essentially poses the same problem of choice even if it is resolved in a different way.
With respect to practicality, one significant disadvantage of the concept of domicile is the
lack of a statutory or case law presumption according to which a person is deemed to
have a domicile in a particular place after a certain amount of time has elapsed. Such a
presumption would certainly make things easier for the courts and administrations, which
have to determine where a person is domiciled. In conclusion, one might say that there is
both light and shadow.
C. Other Common Law Jurisdictions
The concept of domicile has also been adopted in various other common law
jurisdictions. The concepts are naturally similar to the English approach, however certain
notable differences have developed over time.
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1 . India
The Indian concept by and large closely resembles the English concept described
above. Under both Indian and English private international law there are sets of rules
which are similar, e.g. no person can be without a domicile, a person cannot have more
than one domicile, and finally the presumption in favor of the continuation of an existing
domicile.
381 The latter fact is something that also closely resembles the presumption
established by § 19 of the Restatement (Second) with respect to the above-mentioned
American approach. However, there are some differences. First, the notion that no
person can have two domiciles is relaxed by the rule that "a person may have two
7Q7
domiciles simultaneously but for different purposes'. Furthermore, the separation
between the two concepts of domicile of choice and domicile of origin is maintained in
Indian Private International Law. The Indian Succession Act states that domicile is a
creature of law and no person can give it up totally and the law leans very strongly in
IOC
favor of the domicile of origin. " In fact, another section states that a "new domicile
continues until the former domicile has been resumed or another has been required."386
Indian authorities differ with respect to whether the domicile of origin is
automatically resurrected with the abandonment of a domicile of choice. One author,
who criticizes a person's domicile being judged by a country that the person has never
visited, assumes that "under Indian law domicile of choice continues until a new domicile
381 Paras Diwan, Private International Law, Indian and English 152 (4th ed. 1998).
382
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is acquired or the domicile of origin is resumed animo et facto" The contrary view
following the English principle holds that the domicile of origin is automatically revived
TOO
and "without the need of any further act or intention on the part of the person."" ' Intent
is considered to be an "act of mind and like other mental acts, it is difficult to prove.""
The practical difficulty in proving intent can best be illustrated in a case where by
emphasizing certain facts the Kerala High Court came to one conclusion and "by
emphasizing certain other facts the Supreme Court came to another.""3 The Kerala
Court held that the appellant still had sufficient contacts to India and had not abandoned
his domicile of choice. The Supreme Court elicited a number of other factors in the
person's life and reversed the decision, holding that the Indian domicile of choice had
T.QJ
been abandoned. Additionally, the intention to reside at a place or country should be
permanent or for an unlimited time. 39 Thus, the Indian concept will probably run into
the same difficulties with respect to the establishment of intent as the English concept
runs into. Conceptually, the Indian approach is very close to the English concept since it
follows the English rules about the adhesive character of the domicile of origin. 394
2. South Africa
In South Africa, the law of domicile was substantially altered through the
domicile act of 1992. 39 ' In fact, the rules were radically changed. 396 The concept largely
387
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eliminated the concept of domicile of choice.
39.
This approach mainly followed the
recommendations of the English Law Commission,398 discussed above. The law also
introduced a significant progression with respect to the practical difficulty of establishing
a domicile of choice. Section 5 of the domicile act states that the "acquisition or loss of a
person's domicile shall be determined by a court on a balance of probabilities." In this
regard, the recommendations of the English Law Commission were also taken into
account and followed.
401
One of the downsides of the new concept is the fact that a domicile of choice still
requires "intention to settle there for an indefinite period." " The change from the even
stricter English test has been accepted but there is still substantial criticism with respect
to the practical difficulty of establishing a domicile of choice. Especially with respect to
a deceased person there is doubt as to whether the new rule will change the situation for
the better.
4
It has been suggested that the "criterion of intention by the propositus could
have been abandoned, the test for the acquisition of a domicile being the factual one of
the country of closest connection."
404
However, as the language in the new statute clearly
mandates, this was not done.
Thus it can be said that this concept, although progressive, does not solve all the
problems of the concept of domicil, especially not with respect to the practical problem
of establishing the required intention. Although the standard of proof was cut down to
397
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one of mere probability, the introduction of evidence of intention create the same
problems mentioned above. In conclusion, the South African concept is comparable to
the American approach. However, one crucial downside remains, namely the
impracticability with respect to requiring and proving intent to reside permanently.
3. New Zealand
In New Zealand, another common law jurisdiction, the law of domicile was
substantially changed in 1976 by the Domicile Act.
4 5 The acquisition of a new domicile
(which is not expressively termed a "domicile of choice") depends on four factors406 , the
most important two of which are the presence in the particular country407 and the
intention to live "indefinitely in that country."
It is interesting to note that the statute does not use the term "domicile of origin"
anymore except in one section. Section 1 1 of the Domicile Act provides that "the rule of
law known as the revival of domicile of origin whereby a person's domicile of origin
revives upon his abandoning a domicile of choice is hereby abolished."409 It must be
noted that the Law Commission was inspired inter alia by the New Zealand Domicile Act
of 1976 when it drafted its recommendations to abolish the traditional concept of the
domicile of choice.
410
However, the remaining practical difficulty with establishing
proof of intent was not changed by the new legislation. 41
§ 1 (1) of the Act to abolish the dependent domicile of married women and otherwise reform the law
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A workable presumption for assuming intent after a reasonable amount of time
cannot be found. The only provision that deals with such an assumption regarding intent
deals with the transition of intent to live in a union of states into an intent to live in a
country forming part of that union.412 Therefore, the practical difficulties inherent in all
domicile concepts that have been discussed so far remain unsolved in New Zealand's
approach as well.
4. Australia
The approach of the Australian legislature is very similar to the one of New
Zealand. However, it was enacted at a later time. The Domicile Act 1982 also abolished
the common law rule of the revival of a domicile of origin. 413 With respect to the intent
of a person wishing to acquire a domicile of choice, the rule also continues to be that the
intent must be "to make his home indefinitely in that country."414 The only notable
difference between the two pieces of legislation is the fact that with respect to evidence,
the "adhesive character' of the classical common law domicil of origin was expressively
repealed. This can be inferred from Section 12 of the Domicile Act 1982 which states
that the "acquisition of a domicile of choice in place of a domicile of origin may be
established by evidence that would be sufficient to establish the domicile of choice if the
previous domicile had also been a domicile of choice."415 This provision reduces the
evidentiary standard needed to displace a domicile of origin to a reasonable level
comparable to the New Zealand, United States or South African approach.
412
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The previously described practical difficulty in establishing intent for the
acquisition of a domicile of choice remains unsolved by the statute.
However, there is a very significant approach in the area of presumption of intent
which exists in Australian case law. In 1951, Justice Sugarman stated for the Supreme
Court ofNew South Wales that
the principle is, I think, that a person's being in a place is prima facie evidence
that he is domiciled in that place, and it lies on those who say otherwise to rebut
that evidence. If one knows nothing more about a person than that at a given time
he was in one country and that he was born many years before in a different
country, and if it becomes necessary to ascertain his domicile at the first
mentioned time. then. I think, his presence in the firstmentioned country is prima
facie evidence that he was then domiciled there, and in the absence of any
rebutting circumstances that country must be held to have been his then domicile,
and the circumstances that many years earlier he was born in another country is
not a sufficient rebuttal.
,,416
With this presumption, the evidentiary problem that exists in to all common law
concepts of domicile discussed so far. is significantly eased. The fact that this
presumption was crafted in a case involving the domicile of a deceased417 has to be seen
in connection with the criticism about difficulties with establishing intent which were
mentioned by the Law Commission41 and the view that criticizing that position.419 The
presumption as formulated by the Supreme Court of New South Wales allows a suitable
solution in the cases involving cases where the domicile of a deceased person has to be
ascertained.
If the litigants in a lawsuit seek to establish a domicile in a place different from
the last habitual residence of the deceased, they may do so and thus rebut the
416
In re Mc Kenzie (1951) 51 N.S.W. St. R. 293, 298-99 (1951).
^ See id. at 293.
418 Law Com., supra note 281, at 28.
419
ELLISON Kahn, supra note 305, at 675.
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presumption, which is purportedly easy to accomplish. 420 In other words, the "physical
presence" presumption
amounts to no more than that in the absence of any other evidence such a
presence constitutes sufficient evidence from which the existence of a domicile in
that place can be inferred. If other evidence is available, the fact of presence is
merely one of many factors to be considered.
This formula seems to make a lot of practical sense. If somebody other than the
deceased seeks to establish a domicile different from the place of the decedent's last
habitual residence, he or she might do so. However, the person must be aware that the
advantage is with the other party who has the backing of the presumption. In unclear
cases, where the multitude of factors point in different directions, the uncertainty and
confusion that is produced in the outcome of the case would be replaced by a clear-cut
presumption. That would send a message to the party alleging a domicile of choice in a
place different from the decedent's last place of habitual residence that he or she would
have to have sufficient proof to rebut the presumption before the litigation could arise.
One can assume that people would rather stay away from litigation in borderline
cases, thus avoiding the uncertainty of decision-making that could lead to different results
on the exact same facts just by emphasizing one set of factors at the trial court level,
another set on appeal and even a third set in the supreme court of the jurisdiction. 422
In conclusion, the Australian concept of domicile seems to be the most appealing
so far because it combines the overdue abandonment of the backward concept of origin of
domicile with a workable presumption.
420
See Peter Edward Nygh, Conflict of Laws in Australia 1 83 (5th ed. 1 99 1 ).
A2]
Id at 184.
422
See e.g. the discussion about the Kerala case supra Part 0.
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This presumption is especially beneficial in borderline cases, which would make
results more predictable and would not harm the ends of justice, since the presumption
can be rebutted by the presentation of superior evidence.
423 Even though it was held by
the House of Lords in Great Britain that the "mere length of residence by itself is
insufficient evidence from which to infer the animus,"
424
the presumption's above
described practical advantages cannot be denied.
The only possible downside to the concept is that it requires an intention to reside
for an indefinite time at the new place of residence. In the Australian concept, "a clear
and fixed intention to move in the future even though contingent on the occurrence of a
future event, if clearly defined, prevents the acquisition of a domicile of choice even
though the stay may be of indefinite duration.""425 In that regard, the American approach
deserves credit because it only requires an intention "to make that place home for the
time at last."
4 6
Otherwise, the Australian concept is the most advantageous one
discussed so far because it avoids the impractical process of putting factors into evidence
for establishing intent when inappropriate and avoiding an otherwise arbitrary outcome.
5. Ireland
In Ireland, the local Law Commissions Proposals for a substantial reform of the
law of domicile were not accepted. The Irish Domicile and Recognition of Foreign
Divorces Act is an "extremely limited and unduly cautious legislative response to broad
5
The Law Commission has even admitted this fact before it backed out from its intent to establish a
seven-year period of residence as a presumption for intent. See Law COM., supra note 281, at 27
424
425
Ramsay v. Liverpool Royal Infirmary, A.C. 588, 595 (1930).
Edward I. Sykes & Michael S. Pryles, Australian Private International Law, 357 (3rd ed.
1991).
426
See § 18 Restatement (second) of Conflict of Laws ( 1 97 1 ).
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proposals for change made by the Irish Law Reform Commission."427 Consequently,
Ireland still applies the concept of domicile of choice.
However, the concept has a less ''adhesive character" than the English concept; in
other words it is a concept of only "relative tenacity".
429 With respect to the
establishment of intent, there is a special emphasis on the declarations of the person with
respect to the establishment of a new domicile of choice.
430 However, a presumption like
the one just mentioned in the Supreme Court of New South Wales does not exist.
Therefore, is in its approach somewhat comparable to Great Britain. Consequently, the
Irish concept of domicile offers virtually no advantages that can be transferred into
German Private International Law.
6. Canada
The Canadian rules about the law of domicile have not deviated significantly from
the traditional English rules. Domicile is still divided in the two traditional concepts,
namely domicile of choice and domicile of origin.431 The rule about the revival of the
domicile of choice upon the abandonment of a prior domicile of choice is still valid.432
Also the rule about the strict tenacity of the domicile of origin is still upheld because "it
is more difficult to establish a change of domicile when the domicile alleged to have been
displaced is one of origin."
4
Furthermore, the indefiniteness of the intention to reside is
427
Peter North, supra note 293, at 14.
428
See William Binchy, Irish Conflict of Laws 77 ( 1 988).
429
See id.
430
See id. at 67-72.
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See Udny v. Udny, L. R. 1 Sc. & Div. 441 (1869) printed in id.
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still required under Canadian Conflicts of Law rules.
434
In general the rules about a
change of domicile are rather strict. In connection with the important point about the
proof of change of domicile it has been said that there
is a presumption against a change of domicile. The burden of proving any change
of domicile rests therefore upon the person alleging it. A change of domicile is a
serious matter, not to be slightly inferred, and it must be clearly and
unequivocally proved. 4 "
Again, the task of proving a change of domicile is particularly difficult if the
domicile alleged to be displaced is one of origin as opposed to a domicile of choice.
436
With respect to the establishment of a workable presumption about the acquisition of a
domicile of choice after physical presence for a certain period of time, the only notable
statement is that
Residence in a country, especially if it is continued for a long period, is evidence
of an intention to remain there; in the absence of other evidence, residence alone
may support the inference that a domicile has been acquired. Such cases will be
rare, and, while residence is always material evidence, it is seldom decisive, for
slight circumstances may serve to show the absence of a settled intention. 437
In other words, residence might be relatively strong proof for establishing intent,
but a presumption apparently does not exist. The Canadian concept has been under
criticism comparable to what has been expressed about the English concept. Especially
the "excessive importance attached to the domicile of origin and the difficulties involved
in the proof of intention of domicile"' have been pointed out.438 Additionally, it has been
said that "too much weight is given to intention."
See id, at 79 relying on a multitude of both English and Canadian precedents.
435
Id. at 84-85.
™ See id., at 85.
437
Id, at 88.
438
Id. at 93.
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In fact, this particular opinion recommended the replacement of the entire concept
of domicile by the concept of habitual residence.
439 However, only Manitoba enacted
substantial reform legislation that inter alia abolished the domicile of origin concept.
It must be said that the Canadian concept of domicile cannot contribute anything to the
solution of the problem with article 5(1) EGBGB since the concept is subject to the same
criticism that was discussed in connection with the English rules of domicile.
D. Conclusion
In conclusion, the American approach seems to make the most sense when
considering the needs of an internationalized world because it allows a relatively easy
change in the domicile of choice. However, since the element of intent is still necessary
in establishing such a domicile, without the enactment of a presumption regarding the
necessary intent, the concept runs into considerable practical difficulties.
The Australian approach pursued by the Supreme Court of New South Wales
seems to resolve this problem in a reasonable way by establishing such a presumption.
This presumption does not jeopardize the needs of justice since it is rebuttable by
superior evidence. However, that concept has a weakness in that it requires too much for
such a rebuttal: it demands that the intention to change the place of domicile be for an
indefinite time. Intent to stay indefinitely should not be required because in our world
today, many people move to certain jurisdictions for a limited time and with a possible
but "dormant" intention to return to their home jurisdiction one day.
439
Id
Id, at 104.
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However, after a certain amount of time, these people are likely to lose their ties
with that home jurisdiction and it at that time seems appropriate to judge them according
to the law of their new home. Thus, a combination of the two concepts is appealing and
might give some advice regarding the overdue change of article 5(1) EGBGB.
Chapter V-
The Concept of Habitual Residence
Before the final conclusion can be reached, this thesis will now focus on an
alternative concept, which has been developed in Private International Law, namely the
concept of habitual residence. The concept of habitual residence already plays an
important role in the main topic of this thesis, article 5 (1) EGBGB. Its rules and
characteristics will be discussed with an emphasis on a comparison to some of the results
reached above.
A. The German concept
Habitual residence is used in a multitude of different settings and jurisdictions that
have developed different approaches. Since the thesis mainly deals with the amendment
of a German code provision, it seems appropriate to start with the German viewpoint.
The concept of habitual residence has had a long history in German legislation;
however, a statutory provision was never provided.
441
The legislature of the latest private
international code, the EGBGB of 1986, also refrained from a definition because it didn't
want to create discrepancies between the statutory provision and international
conventions or treaties that also relied on habitual residence as a connecting factor. 442
441 Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht [Private International Law] 254 (2d. ed. 1994).
442
See id.
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However, a German statutory provision has always been relied upon for an approximate
definition of the term habitual residence. According to section 9 of the federal tax code, a
person has her habitual residence where she ''resides under circumstances which allow
the inference that she will stay in this particular location or territorial unit not only
temporarily."
443
In the German judicature, another definition has been used. According
to the Federal Court of Justice, the place of habitual residence is "the location or the
center of gravity of family or professional ties of the person, thus her center of
existence." However, these formulas are not workable definitions but mere
approximations that have to be further interpreted in order to be applicable to the
requirements of practical litigation. 445
There are some general elements. First, according to the plain meaning of the
word "residence", there must be some sort of physical presence. The mere intention to
settle in a particular state or territorial unit is not in itself sufficient.
446
Furthermore, the
term "habitual" indicates that the mere physical presence has to be strengthened by an
element of duration.
447 Of course, the duration can be interrupted by some breaks during
which the person is not present in the particular place, but the residence has to be at least
the place at which the person can be found regularly. 448
It is important to note at this point that a requirement of direct, expressed and
provable intention is unnecessary. In fact, the Federal Court of Justice pointed out in the
443
§ 9 Abgabenordnung [AO] (F.R.G.).
444
Bundesgerichtshof, Neue juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 28 (1975), 1068 (1068).
445
KROPHOLLER, supra note 441, at 256.
See id.
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See Bundesgerichtshof, Neue juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 28 (1975), 1068 (1068).
448
KROPHOLLER, supra note 441. at 256.
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decision mentioned above that if the physical presence extends for a long period of time,
an intent to make the place or territorial unit the person's habitual residence is not
necessary.
449 The court stated in another decision that the "question of whether a habitual
residence has been acquired mainly depends on factual circumstances."
5 On the other
hand, intent is not considered to be irrelevant. It was held for instance, that if the
residence is planned to be permanent at the time of arrival, habitual residence could be
acquired at the moment the physical presence was established. 4 ^ 1 However, the majority
of courts have also established that the intention is completely irrelevant if the law of the
physical presence in the territorial unit is recognizably illegal.
4
In other words, the mere factual length of residence and the accompanying factual
ties to the place of residence will give rise to the assumption at some point of time, that
this particular place is the person's habitual residence. A static time frame has not
been established, although for minors a time period of six months was held to be
sufficient by the German Federal Court of Justice.454 However, in that decision the court
pointed out that the time period of six months is just a rough estimate of the time that is
necessary to establish the social connections that are necessary in order to consider a
place to be the "habitual" residence.
One of the major commentaries has even gone a little further in using the rough
estimate for the habitual residence of minors and formulated the estimate rule to be
449
Bundesgerichtshof, Neue juristische Wochenschrift [NJW], 34 (1981), 520, 521.
450
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Bundesgerichtshof, Neue juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 45 (1993), 637, 638.
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See id.
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applicable to the acquisition of a habitual residence in general.
4
" However, one has to
note that the duration rule should only be used as an indicator for the social integration,
which is the only factor that can justify the application of the law at the place of residence
forjudging the person's status. In other words, the place of his or her habitual residence
should be acquired where the person has already established his or her center of gravity
for living.
4
With that background in mind and assuming that social integration takes a longer
period of time for adults than for children, " a longer period should be established. In
addition, it should be clearly pointed out, that the presumption for social integration can
be rebutted by an expressed and discernable intent to stay connected with a place other
than the habitual residence.
459
In fact, it has been recommended that if a certain time
frame should ever be established for a presumption that someone has his or her habitual
residence at a certain place, it should be rebuttable for purposes of allowing justice in
i 460
ever)' special case.
Therefore, it is safe to say that intention does not have to be proved in the
majority of cases. It can be used to rebut the presumption of acquisition of habitual
residence after a certain time has elapsed, but it is not a requisite for the acquisition of a
habitual residence. One should also take into account that the Federal Court of Justice
also held that a habitual residence can be acquired in a new place of living immediately
upon arrival if the element of physical presence has some element of permanence in it.
456
See PALANDT, supra note 177, at 2307.
457
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458
See id.
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The court did not require an "indefinite" intent to stay (like most common law
jurisdictions do for the acquisition of a domicile of choice) but expressed the view that if
the factual circumstances point towards a stay for a longer period of time, the habitual
residence can be acquired immediately.
461
Additionally, it is important to note that,
according to the majority view, a person can only have one habitual residence.
Taken altogether, the concept can be elaborated as follows. The German concept
of habitual residence enables stability due to its definiteness, e.g. a person can only have
one habitual residence as the center of gravity of his or her life. In that regard, the
concept is very comparable with the domicile concept in all common law jurisdictions,
namely that a person can only have one domicile for the same purpose.
Furthermore, the German concept enables a person to acquire a new habitual
residence in a certain place if certain objective factors indicate an intention to make the
place a permanent home at least for some time. This is a good example of a flexible
reaction to an increasingly mobile population. Just like the American concept, the place
of the new residence can become the habitual residence right upon the person's arrival
and an intention to remain "indefinitely" (like under the English concept of domicile) is
not required.
But in addition to that, the German concept of habitual residence avoids the
uncertainties and perils to which the common law concept subjects itself by requiring
proof of having an intent to make the new place or territorial unit the person's home.
Plus, to make matters even more insecure and impractical, the common law concept puts
461 BGHZ 78, 293 (295).
462
See PALANDT, supra note 177, at 2305; KROPHOLLER, supra note 445, at 260.
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the burden of proof for this purpose on the person alleging the acquisition of the domicile
of choice. The German concept avoids all this by simply not requiring a subjective factor
to be proven but rather an objective one, namely a certain degree of integration into the
social life of the residency. And this factor is established without any need for proof after
a certain period of time, roughly estimated to be six months. Finally, the ends of justice
are not jeopardized because the presumption is rebuttable.
In conclusion, the concept has great advantages because it combines the attainable
goal of judging a person according to the law to which he or she is most closely
connected with the advantage of reaching this goal by establishing a workable
presumption that can be rebutted if the objective indicators point in a direction different
from the place of mere physical presence.
B. The approach of common law jurisdictions
The concept of habitual residence has also been used in common law
jurisdictions.463 The House of Lords held in 1990 that the concept of habitual residence
AHA
"is nowhere defined
,
\ However, some approximate formulas were used earlier. In a
case from 1974, the court had to deal with a statutory provision that regulated the validity
of an overseas divorce or legal separation and depended on habitual residence.465 In
connection with this particular decision, it has been said that the definition of habitual
residence can be summed up as "a regular physical presence which must endure for some
time/'466
463
See CASTEL, supra note 43 1 , at 102.
464
In re J. (A Minor), 2 A.C. 562, 578 (1990); CASTEL, supra note 431, at 103.
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For details see Cruse v. Chittum, 2 All E.R. 940, 943 (1974).
466 NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 6, at 169.
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However, that opinion is not citing the court's view but the argument of the
petitioner's counsel. In fact, the court's own conclusion about the case consists of only
one paragraph that doesn't give any specific formula for the term of habitual residence.
Therefore, habitual residence lacks a concise definition, but it can also be assumed that
-IfA
the concept "does connote actual residence plus some continuity and persistence." ' As
the language of that definition indicates, the element of intent, which is required for the
acquisition of a habitual residence, can at the very least considered to be "weaker"
469
or
significantly reduced ' compared to the same requirement in the acquisition of a
domicile of choice.
The habitual residence must be voluntarily adopted, but no "deep examination of
the person's state of mind is required."4 ' Another scholar even states that "no more than
a present intention to reside should be necessary for habitual residence and this ought to
be assumed from the fact of continuous residence." . Another opinion by a legal
scholar states that an "intention to stay for the rest of one's life is not necessary, but some
limited degree of settled, even if temporary, purpose is essential, and it may be that long-
term residence must be intended."
47
The amount of time that has to elapse in order to
assume habitual residence has not been definitely fixed. In fact, it has been said that one
of the major drawbacks of the concept is that it is not clear how long the residence must
467
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be before it can be considered to be habitual.
474
The House of Lords held in 1990 that
habitual residence requires an "appreciable period of time and a settled intention,"
although there are cases indicating that a period of time under one year can already be
sufficient with respect to minors.
476
As the latest development in this area of the law, it has been held in an
unpublished decision that a period of three or four years is clearly sufficient, and it was
concluded that "the lower courts have recognised that the adoption by the House of Lords
in Re J of a requirement of an "appreciable' period of actual residence amounts to a false
.177
step, and that its effect should be minimised so far as possible." However, even though
the process of establishing tangible, concise rules for the concept of habitual residence is
a task for the courts, there has been "a regrettable tendency of the courts, despite their
insistence that they are not dealing with a term of art, to develop rules as to when habitual
residence may and may not be established."478
A little more concise suggestion to formalize the acquisition of a habitual
residence has been made in Ireland. The Irish Law Reform Commission has not only
suggested to replace the concept of domicile with the concept of habitual residence but
has also formulated that the term "habitual residence" should be defined by the
legislature, rather than by the courts, even though a statutory formulation would lead to
the development of technical rules.
474
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In conclusion, there are some discernable differences between the German and the
common law concept of habitual residence. One major difference can be found in the
impossibility of an immediate acquisition of a new habitual residence whenever a person
moves to a new area under the principle of the common law. In the words of the House
of Lords, a person cannot become habitually resident in a single day. 480 As seen above,
that is possible under the German approach. Thus, a significant weakness of the concept
can be found in the inability or unwillingness to come up with a presumption with respect
to the element of intention. Therefore, the Law Commission rightfully stated in its report
on the reform of the law of domicile that one of the problems with the concept of habitual
residence is its
"undeveloped state as a legal concept. There is no broad agreement as to the
degree of importance which is to be given to intention in determining whether
residence is habitual; nor is it clear how long residence must persist to become
habitual/'
481
However, this criticism is only valid for the common law concept of habitual
residence, at least with respect to the degree of importance that the person's intention has.
Under the German concept, this factor is clear since the intention of the person can be
assumed from the duration of the physical presence in a certain area or territory.
C. The approach of the Hague Conventions and the European council
The concept of habitual residence has also been used by a number of Hague
Conventions on Private International Law.482 However, the tern of habitual residence as
a connecting factor was never defined. 48 "3 A notable step towards defining the concept of
80
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481 Law. Com., supra note 281, at 10.
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habitual residence was taken in 1972 by the Resolution 72 of the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe. 484 For the first time, a concise set of rules was set out. The
first of these rules set forth that the concept of habitual residence is independent from the
legal entitlement to reside.
48?
Furthermore, the resolution indicated that the term
residence "or its equivalent in most European languages and legal system suggests more
than mere presence in a place." However, the importance of intent is relatively low,
just like it is under the concepts which were explained so far. The resolution stated that
the voluntary establishment of a residence and a person's intention to maintain it
are not conditions of the existence of a residence or an habitual residence, but a
person's intentions may be taken into account in determining whether he
• 4517
possesses a residence or the character of that residence.
More importantly, the resolution pointed out explicitly how important the
duration of physical residence is for a residence in order to become a habitual residence.
The resolution stated that
in determining whether a residence is habitual, account is to be taken of the
duration and the continuity of the residence as well as of other facts of a personal
or professional nature which point to durable ties between a person and his
residence.
488
However, the explanatory notes to this rule did not mention any specific time
frame after which the residence could be considered to be sufficiently durable and
489
continuous.
The resolution is reprinted in its original English version in 20 Nederlands TiJDSCHRlFT Voor
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Furthermore, the resolution stated at another point that intention is very important,
even if it is not considered to be a prerequisite for establishing a residence. The
resolution reads as follows:
For residence and for habitual residence it is not always necessary, as it is for
domicile, to prove the intention to establish or maintain a residence, and the
intention to make the country or place of residence the centre of one's interest
(see Rule No. 1). But whether a person has in fact established a residence or
habitual residence in a place can often be determined only by taking into account
1 > H490
that person s intentions.
If one reads the language of that official comment carefully, it doesn't come as a
surprise that the resolution did not come up with a presumption for the inference of the
intent to stay after a certain time of physical presence has elapsed. If the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe thought that the acquisition of habitual residence can
often be determined only by taking into account that person's intentions, then a
presumption seems to be some sort of an artificial product which could only come up
with an inference of intention. If the person's intentions are however considered to be a
crucial factor in the determination, such a presumption was probably unpalatable to the
committee of ministers and was therefore not established.
In conclusion, this particular concept of habitual residence includes the traditional
element of the relative unimportance of intention. However, the concept is not very
elaborated and is only the starting point of a workable interpretation of the concept. But
obviously, this was also one of the goals of the resolution. It was addressed to the
governments of member states of the Council of Europe as a guide in their process to
490
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enact legislation.
491 The resolution was drafted to leave the judges in various
jurisdictions enough discretion to carve out a more specialized set of rules over time.
A very recent proposal for a European Council Regulation on jurisdiction and the
recognition ofjudgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility
for joint children has also adopted the use of habitual residence as a connecting factor.
According to article 2 (a) of the draft regulation, jurisdiction shall lie with the courts of
the Member State in whose territory the spouses are habitually resident. 493 According to
article 3 of the draft regulation, jurisdiction in a matter relating to parental responsibility
is also conferred upon a Member State on the basis of the place of habitual residence of
the child.
494
It is interesting to note that neither the official commentary of the proposal
for a Council Regulation, nor the regulation itself contains a definition of the concept of
habitual residence. Obviously, the same openness towards various interpretations by
future member states has prevailed over the need for a uniform definition of the concept.
However, at least the tendency towards preferring habitual residence as a concept for
connecting a matter of status with a certain territory can be illustrated by the fact that the
proposed regulation uses the term "habitual residence" rather than domicile. Another
interesting fact about the proposed regulation is that it also confers jurisdiction on a
Member State if both spouses have the nationality of that Member State. 49:>
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This concession can be understood if one bears in mind that a significant number
of countries that still follow the concept which uses nationality as a major connecting
factor.
D. Conclusion
The concept of habitual residence is relatively well developed. The development
in Germany and to some extent in common law jurisdictions has revealed the potential of
the concept by carving out a workable set of definitions and rules. In fact, the "birth
defect" of the rather unshaped terms in 1 972 has been cured by practical application of
the concept by various courts. In addition to that, the lack of a too stringent definition
would still leave sufficient room for an internationalized definition. 496
The concept has significant advantages. In contrast to the concepts of domicile
and nationality, the person could never be connected with a territory that she has never
visited; and even after a very long stay, a habitual residence would not be acquired
because the factual social connections could still point towards the person's former
home. The concept would also be superior from the practical viewpoint because a
presumption with respect to the inference of the acquisition of a new habitual residence is
constructed to be rebuttable. The concept has been reasonably developed and reacts to
the increasing mobility far better and far more appropriately than the static concept of
nationality. Additionally, the concept can also be considered to be better suited for
determining a person's status than the concept of domicile.
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™ See id. at 257.
See id. at 263.
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The latter attaches too much value to the determining of an intention to reside.
Intention to reside is only one factor in determining the social connection with a certain
territory or area of residence. There are many other, more objective factors that should be
considered equally
500
and should not only be introduced through the backdoor of proving
the person's intention.
The lack of a concise definition cannot be considered to be a disadvantage
anymore since practical experience has revealed that courts can come up with a workable
set of rules where the traditional concept left gaps. 5 ' It can therefore not be said
anymore that the concept is legally underdeveloped as a legal concept.'
Of course, the question that has been asked throughout this entire section remains
unanswered: if a rebuttable presumption of habitual residence should be established after
a certain time of physical presence has elapsed, how long will the period of time have to
be in order to reconcile the needs for stability and determinability on the one hand and the
danger of connecting a person with a territory to which he or she has no substantial
connection'^
03
on the other ? The suggestion that the Law Commission made in their
working paper seems to be the most appropriate. It was said that a period of seven years
would strike the right balance between the interests of the person willing to rebut the
presumption with contrary evidence and the interests of courts and practitioners who
wouldn't have to go into a lengthy investigation about the person's intention. 504
00
See Elizabeth Mc Donald, Domicile: Certainty or Flexibility ?, 135 NEW L. J. 865, 866 (1985)
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In comparison, the time limit established by the German approach seems to be
less desirable since it establishes the presumption already after the extremely short period
of six months for minors and a longer, but unclear period of time for adults. It must be
doubted that such a short period of time would respect the need for continuation of
traditional legal and social ties of a person to an appreciable extent. Therefore, a mixed
form of common law and civil law concepts of habitual residence seems to be preferable.
05
See discussion supra Part V.A.
Chapter VI-
CONCLUDING SUGGESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO A CHANGE IN ARTICLE 5 (1) EGBGB
The final point of this thesis will be a set of suggestions with respect to the
necessary change of article 5 (1) EGBGB. It has been pointed out in the discussion that
the new citizenship law will have a significant impact on German Private International
Law since it is constitutional 506 and since it will increase the number of inhabitants with
double nationality. Furthermore, it was concluded that the current
article 5(1) EGBGB is not able to handle the implications of that development especially
since the second sentence of that provision in effect declares German law to be applicable
ii 508
in all cases.
The common law concept of domicile cannot particularly contribute to a solution
of the problem, especially due to the practical problems of its application. However,
some elements of the particular concepts of domicile, which are closest to the concept of
habitual residence, can be used for a more flexible approach.
509
The concept of habitual
residence seems to be a workable concept, especially since it already plays a significant
role under the first sentence of article 5(1) EGBGB which seeks to determine a person's
"effective nationality'' by establishing the closest connection over the factor of habitual
residence.
510
It should be noted in this context, that the law reform commission in one
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See discussion supra Part II. D.
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510 EGBGB art. 5(1) (F.R.G.).
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Ill
common law jurisdiction has already suggested the replacement of the concept of
domicile by the concept of habitual residence. 511 The common law jurisdiction of Nauru
has already taken that step and enacted such a replacement.
512
Consequently, the concept
has been evaluated as "the most appropriate concept to meet the demands of a fluid,
modern society.""
The disadvantages of the concept of nationality do not have to be named here
again since many authors have already pointed them out for a long period of time
already.
?14
It should also be noted that the concept of habitual residence is already
extremely close to the more modern forms of the domicile concept, such as the one
applied in the United States." 1 The concept of habitual residence has been considered to
be a "midpoint" l or a "popular via media" 3 ' 7 between the competing concepts of
nationality and modern forms of domicile, and this fact could even lead to a very
desirable reconciliation of the two concepts at some point in the future.
Thus, if a complete replacement is still impossible for the time being, there should
be at least a stronger application of the concept whenever it is appropriate. In the case of
article 5 (1) EGBGB, that seems to be the case because an application of nationality
together with habitual residence would combine the undeniable practical advantages of
the application of the lexfori with the possibility to establish a different, closer
511
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connection with another jurisdiction. If sentence two of current article 5 would be
deleted, the concept of habitual residence would apply to all cases in which foreign
nationals who fall under the scope of the new citizenship law are involved.
Another possibility that has been suggested would be a further amendment of
article 5(1) EGBGB. According to the suggestion, German nationality conferred upon
the person by virtue of the new § 4 (3) StAG should always be rendered "ineffective" by
CIO
another amendment of article 5. That suggestion would however complicate matters
because judges, who have possibly never studied German Private International Law
would be confronted with an even more specialized test that would divide the inhabitants
of Germany into many different groups and would declare different rules to be applicable
for each of these groups.
Furthermore, this approach would deny all foreign children, who are born in
Germany after the enactment of the new citizenship law, the applicability of German law
even though it might be the only law they ever get to know in their entire life. In other
words, one rigid rule (the second sentence of article 5 (1) EGBGB) would be displaced
by another rigid rule under special circumstances. However, the second sentence of
article 5 has been rightfully criticized for being too rigid and for not taking a more
flexible approach. Naturally, the suggested concept would not at all increase the
flexibility but would, on the contrary, follow the current second sentence of
article 5 (1) EGBGB with respect to its rigidity. In conclusion, the suggestion does not
seem to make much sense because it would complicate matters and would be too rigid in
itself.
5,8
See Gruber, supra note 3, at 429.
113
The final recommendation addressed to the legislature in Germany should
therefore be the following: The second sentence of article 5(1) EGBGB has been around
for 14 years now, and that is 14 years too long already. The legislature should delete the
sentence and return to the concept of flexible "effective nationality" which makes use of
the concept of habitual residence and enables everyone to have the best of both worlds.
Appendix
Author's translation of the relevant portions of the law incorporating
and amending the legislation on citizenship law
I. (Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz; StAG)
§ 4 StAG
(3) A child of foreign nationals acquires the German nationality by virtue of birth within
the country if one of the parents
1
.
maintained its habitual residence within the country for a period of at least
eight years and
2. possesses either a permanent right to reside or has possessed an unlimited
residence permit for a period of at least three years.
§ 29 StAG
(1) A German national who acquired his German nationality after the 31 st of December
1999 either by virtue of § 4 (3) or by naturalization pursuant to § 40 b and who possesses
another foreign nationality, upon reaching the age of maturity or upon notice pursuant to
subsection 5, is required to state his intention whether he wants to keep the German or the
foreign nationality. The statement has to be in writing.
(2) If the foreign national states pursuant to subsection 1 that he wants to keep the foreign
114
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nationality, the German nationality ceases to exist upon receipt of the statement by the
competent government agency. Furthermore, it ceases to exist if no statement has been
made until the completion of 23 years of age.
(3) If the foreign national states pursuant to subsection 1 that he wants to keep the
German nationality, he is obliged to prove the abandonment or the loss of the foreign
nationality. If proof has not been submitted until the completion of 23 years of age, the
German nationality ceases to exist unless the person has received a written permission
that permits him to keep the foreign nationality (permission to keep nationality) by the
competent government agency. The application for issuing such a permission can -also
as a precaution- only be submitted until the completion of 21 years of age (term of
preclusion). The loss of the German nationality is only effective if the permission is
denied and that decision rests in res judicata. Preliminary legal protection according to
§ 123 Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (VwGO) is possible.
(4) The permission to keep the nationality according to subsection 3 has to be granted if
the abandonment or loss of the foreign nationality is either impossible or the
abandonment would result in an unacceptable hardship. This is also valid if the case is
one where pursuant to § 87 Auslandergesetz (AuslG) a naturalization would require or
allow the acceptance of a resulting double nationality.
§ 40 b StAG
A foreign national who lawfully has his or her habitual residence within the country on
116
the 1st of January 2000 and has not reached the age of 10 years, has a right to be
naturalized, if upon his birth the requirements of § 4 (3) StAG were present and continue
to be present. The deadline for the necessary application for being naturalized runs on
the 31st of December 2000.
II. Auslandergesetz (AuslG)
§ 87 AuslG
(1) The requirement of § 85 (1) Nr. 4 is excused, if the foreign national cannot abandon
his foreign nationality or if the abandonment would only be possible under extremely
difficult circumstances. These circumstances are present if
Nr. 1 ) the law of the foreign country whose nationality is in question does not
allow the abandonment of its nationality.
Nr.2)(...)
Nr.3)(...)
Nr.4) if the denaturalization is accompanied by disproportionate difficulties and
the denial of the naturalization is an unbearable hardship.
Nr.5) if the denaturalization would result in a substantial loss of rights with
respect to property, heritage or matrimonial matters.
(2) The requirement will also be excused if the person who is to be naturalized possesses
the nationality of a Member State of the European Union and if reciprocity exists.
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